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This dissertation explores conflicts between religion and medicine, cases in which 
cultural and religious beliefs motivate requests for inappropriate treatment or the 
cessation of treatment, requests that violate the standard of care.  I call such requests M-
requests (miracle or martyr requests).  I argue that current approaches fail to accord 
proper respect to patients who make such requests.  Sometimes they are too permissive, 
honoring M-requests when they should not; other times they are too strict.   
I propose a phronesis-based approach to decide whether to honor an M-request or 
whether religious beliefs are medically valid.  This approach is culturally sensitive, takes 
religious beliefs seriously, and holds them to a high ethical standard.  This approach uses 
a principle of belief evaluation developed by Linda Zagzebski: The Principle of Rational 
Belief, which is founded upon Aristotelian virtue ethics.  In addition to the Principle, I 
propose a concrete set of conditions to assist caregivers in clinical case evaluations. 
In the final chapters, I apply the phronesis-based approach to well-known adult 
cases such as the refusal of blood transfusions by Jehovah‟s Witnesses and requests for 
continued (futile) care by Orthodox Jews at the end of life.  Also, I consider cases 
involving children such as African female circumcision and cases of faith healing.  I 
argue that The Principle of Rational Belief should define the threshold of the kinds of M-
requests for children that can be honored, but I allow a lower threshold for M-requests 
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In the hospital, patients and their families, who come from diverse cultural 
backgrounds, bring with them their religious beliefs.  This is how it should be.  The 
religious beliefs of patients give them great comfort and support, but religious beliefs can 
also influence their decision-making, which may become a problem if their choices 
violate the standard of care.  I will call such choices M-requests (miracle or martyr 
requests): requests for inappropriate treatment or the inappropriate cessation of treatment 
based on religious beliefs.  
In the Journal of Medical Ethics, Michael Wreen argues that the religious beliefs 
of patients and their families deserve respect.  Here he explains how religion serves an 
important function in our lives:  
Religion has to do with (i) describing and explaining the human condition at its 
most fundamental level; (ii) providing a person with a unique concept of personal 
identity, in the fullest sense of the term; and (iii) making sense of ourselves and 
the world around us in a complete and satisfying way. One of the primary pieces 
of the business of religion, in short, is to give a sense to the expression „the 
meaning of life‟. It reconciles us, at a deep existential level, to ourselves, to our 
world, to each other, and most of all to our limitations and relative importance. 
Religious beliefs and values are therefore not on a par with other beliefs and 
values a rational person might have, such as ones regarding red objects, however 
dear to a person‟s heart such beliefs and values may be…Not to respect an 
autonomous person‟s refusal of treatment when that refusal is religiously based is 




Wreen thinks that M-requests should have special standing, that they should be given 
more consideration than “inappropriate” requests based on patients‟ idiosyncratic 
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 Parts of this chapter appear in an earlier form in Gregory L. Bock, “Medically Valid Religious Beliefs,” 
Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (2008) 437-440. 
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In response, Julian Savulescu argues that such a point of view is discriminatory 
against atheists because requests motivated by religion are given preferential treatment.
4
   
In reply to Savulescu, Orr and Genesen modify their definition of “religion” to include 
atheism and other non-traditional worldviews.
5
  I do not have the space here to explore 
whether atheism serves the same purposes that traditional religious views do, but I will 
define “religious belief” broadly, including the beliefs of any worldview that fulfill the 
functions Wreen describes.  
 The religious beliefs of patients and families deserve respect, and M-requests 
should be given special consideration.  However, not all such requests should be honored 
because many of them are morally disturbing, such as when parents prevent their children 
from getting urgent medical care.  Nevertheless, the problem is in drawing the line, in 
deciding whether M-requests are medically valid.  
 In this dissertation, I propose a phronesis-based approach for deciding when to 
honor M-requests.  This approach, I argue, is culturally sensitive and holds M-requests to 
a high moral standard.   
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 Robert D. Orr and Leigh B Genesen, “Requests for „Inappropriate‟ Treatment Based on Religious 
Beliefs,” Journal of Medical Ethics 23 (1997)142-147. 
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  Julian Savulescu, “Two Worlds Apart: Religion and Ethics.” Journal of Medical Ethics 24 (1993) 382. 
Savulescu also makes the stronger claim that religious beliefs are less rational than others (implication: they 
have less standing). Religious requests, he claims, are based on irrational beliefs that are probably false. 
Ethics, on the other hand, is reasonable and factual. In later chapters, I show that religious beliefs can be 
rational, but aside from these considerations, I think Michael Wreen (1991) makes a solid argument that 
religions are special and worthy of consideration; see also Huston Smith, Why Religion Matters: the Fate of 
the Human Spirit in an Age of Disbelief (New York: HarperCollins, 2001). 
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 In chapter two, I examine religious beliefs and M-requests in the following four 
cases: (1) Jehovah‟s Witnesses and the refusal of blood transfusions, (2) African female 
circumcision, (3) Orthodox Judaism and end-of-life care, and (4) faith healing.  I explore 
how religious beliefs are justified in these cases and communities, how the physical body 
and medicine are viewed from their perspectives, and what virtues they promote.  For 
each, I explain the cultural background and beliefs involved.  All four cases reappear for 
discussion in subsequent chapters.  
 In chapter three, I briefly explore the philosophical basis of the liberty of 
conscience and its limits when it comes to healthcare.  Second, I examine the standard of 
care as described in the medical literature.  Third, I consider some approaches to handling 
M-requests and argue that they are either ineffective or insensitive to patients‟ religious 
beliefs, being either too permissive or too strict.  They inappropriately allow or deny M-
requests at different times.  Sometimes the standard of care overrides an M-request 
without giving it sufficient consideration; other times, M-requests trump the standard of 
care in the name of patient autonomy and religious tolerance.  In both cases, decisions are 
made without adequately engaging the patient‟s beliefs.  True respect requires taking 
beliefs seriously, which means that caregivers should attempt to understand the patient‟s 
point of view and subject the beliefs to standards that govern all other discourse in the 
public square: standards of reason.  
In chapter four, I propose a phronesis-based approach which uses a principle of 
belief evaluation created by Linda Zagzebski.  She calls the principle the Principle of 
Rational Belief (PRB) and develops it from Aristotelian virtue ethics, in which the 
4 
 
phronimos (the virtuous person) is the standard against which belief-formation can be 
judged.  In addition, I provide an analysis of some intellectual virtues such as the love of 
knowledge, firmness, and humility.  Finally, I propose a set of conditions that can be 
employed in clinical case consultations.  
In chapter five, I apply the approach to some of the cases from chapter two: (1) 
Jehovah‟s Witnesses and the refusal of blood transfusions and (2) Orthodox Judaism and 
end-of-life care.  I conclude that when the patients in these cases are competent adults, 
the M-requests should be honored. 
In chapter six, I consider Savulescu‟s conditions for deciding M-requests for 
children and conclude that his approach is flawed.  While his conditions hold M-requests 
to a high moral standard, they are culturally insensitive, and I suggest an alternative set of 
conditions to remedy this problem.  I apply these to pediatric cases involving Jehovah‟s 
















 With the diversity of religious beliefs on our planet, there are an untold number of 
examples of M-requests.  Some M-requests are common while others are peculiar to 
individuals.  In this dissertation, I have chosen to focus on four relatively common cases, 
but the approach I develop can be applied to any M-request.  The cases are the following: 
(1) the refusal of blood transfusions by Jehovah‟s Witnesses, (2) African female 
circumcision, (3) Orthodox Judaism and futile treatment at the end of life, and (4) faith 
healing. 
 
Jehovah’s Witnesses and Blood Transfusions 
 
 Case: Joy 
Joy is a thirteen year old Jehovah‟s Witness (JW) who developed anemia due to a 
massive Staphylococcus infection, which affected her blood, bones, and lungs. 
With antibiotics, her condition improved, but her physicians now believe they 
must intervene surgically to remove the excess pus and scar tissue in her chest 
cavity. However, they are unwilling to do so without recourse to a blood 
transfusion because Joy‟s anemia makes the procedure very risky. Joy and her 
parents have stated that they are against the transfusion, and Joy has clearly and 
intelligently articulated her religious beliefs and the JW position on blood in the 





 Adult JW patients will often refuse blood transfusions even if a transfusion is 
medically necessary.  It has been estimated that around one thousand Witnesses die each 
year because of this.
7
  In addition, JW parents often refuse medically necessary blood 
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 Adapted from Robert Orr and Debra Craig, “Old Enough” Hastings Center Report, (November-December 
2007) 15-6. 
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 Phil Wilson, “Jehovah‟s Witness Children: When Religion and the Law Collide,” Paediatric Nursing 17 
(3) (April 2005) 35. 
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transfusions for their children, but current medical practice usually overrules such 
refusals, giving a child‟s physical well-being precedence over religious beliefs.  In such 
cases, the state will often take temporary custody of JW children in order to transfuse 
them. 
JWs hold a high view of physical life, and they usually seek aggressive medical 
treatment for sickness and disease.  Nevertheless, they believe that this earthly life is not 
the end, and obedience to the God of the Bible is more important.  Osamu Muramoto 
claims that the following doctrines of the Watchtower (WTS), the organizational body of 
Jehovah‟s Witnesses, are important to understanding the teachings about blood: 
1) Armageddon is near, in which all mankind will be destroyed except faithful 
JWs who will live forever on earth; 2) The WTS governing body is believed to be 
the “faithful and discreet slave” referred to in Jesus‟ parable at Matthew 24:45, 
divinely appointed by Jesus Christ to lead the JWs; 3) The Bible cannot be 
understood without interpretation by the “faithful and discreet slave”; 4) JWs who 
openly criticize the leadership and the organization are regarded as apostates, 





JWs believe that they will live forever, either with God or on a new earth, but this future 
is contingent on their obedience to God‟s commands in the Bible.   
They believe that the Bible prohibits the consumption of blood.  This belief is 
supported by passages such as the following: “Only you shall not eat flesh with its life, 
that is, its blood” (Genesis 9:4, NASV); “You are not to eat any blood, either of bird or 
animal, in any of your dwellings.  Any person who eats any blood, even that person shall 
be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:26-27, NASV); “I will set my face against that 
person who eats blood and will cut him off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:10, 
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 Osamu Muramoto, “Bioethics of the Refusal of Blood by Jehovah‟s Witnesses: Part 1. Should Bioethical 
Deliberation Consider Dissidents‟ Views?” Journal of Medical Ethics 24 (1998) 224. 
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NASV); “Only be sure not to eat the blood, for the blood is the life, and you shall not eat 
the life with the flesh.” (Deuteronomy 12:23, NASV); “For it seemed good to the Holy 
Spirit and to us to lay upon you no greater burden than these essentials: that you abstain 
from things sacrificed to idols and from blood and from things strangled and from 
fornication; if you keep yourselves free from such things, you will do well”
9
 (Acts 15:28-
29, NASV); “But concerning the Gentiles who have believed, we wrote, having decided 
that they should abstain from meat sacrificed to idols and from blood and from what is 
strangled and from fornication” (Acts 21:25, NASV).   
  The WTS teaches that these ancient biblical commands apply to the modern 
practice of blood transfusion as well, at least to whole blood products.  This does not, 
however, preclude the use of some blood components.  In an article that was the standard 
statement of JW blood policy for many years, Dixon and Smalley state,  
Each Witness must decide individually if he can accept [albumin, immune 
globulins, and hemophiliac preparations]…Witnesses believe that blood removed 
from the body should be disposed of, so they do not accept autotransfusion of 
predeposited blood. Techniques from intraoperative collection or hemodilution 
that involve blood storage are objectionable to them. However, many Witnesses 
permit the use of dialysis and heart-lung equipment (non-blood-prime) as well as 
intraoperative salvage where the extracorporeal circulation is uninterrupted…The 




A more recent article states, 
 
The religious beliefs of Jehovah‟s Witnesses prohibit them from accepting 
homologous or autologous blood products, including packed red blood cells, 
white blood cells, platelets, and plasma, as a part of even life-saving medical 
therapy. Therapies such as albumin, cryoprecipitate, and intraoperative salvage 
represent a gray area. Various groups of Jehovah‟s Witnesses hold slightly 
                                                 
9
 It is of interest that the consumption of blood is condemned in the same verse that condemns sexual 
immorality. 
10
 J. Lowell Dixon and M. Gene Smalley, “Jehovah‟s Witnesses: The Surgical/Ethical Challenge,” Journal 
of American Medical Association 246 (November 27, 1981) 2471-2472. 
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different beliefs and, preferably, the use of these therapies needs to be specified 
by the individual patient. Fluid replacement with crystalloid and other types of 
colloid is generally acceptable as are hemostatic agents such as desmopressin, 




In sum, the WTS teaches that the biblical command concerning blood consumption 
applies to blood transfusions.  However, this only applies to certain blood products; some 
blood components are acceptable.
12
 
 JWs believe that blood is symbolic of life and that life is sacred.  Although some 
critics say that the deeper theological reasoning behind the WTS prohibition of blood 
transfusions is unclear,
13
 some have speculated that it has to do with a concept of spiritual 
purity.  Richard Singelenberg, for example, explains that in many cultures blood is 
essential to group identity and that in Hindu culture blood transfusions are only allowed 
among kin in order to preserve the purity of the caste.  “Pollution of an individual‟s blood 
means a stain on the whole caste.”
14
  He says that JWs have a similar understanding of 
blood:  
In the Society‟s blood transfusion doctrine, this consanguinity aspect plays a 
partial role. As shown above, the Society often stressed the questionable 
characteristics of the donor category, transferring its evil qualities into the 
believer‟s bodily system. The analogy with the Indian caste is obvious: reception 
meant individual, and accordingly, group pollution. However, a significant flaw 
emerges: why is transfusion among Witnesses not allowed? It should be noted 
that defection among the Society‟s adherents is considerable… In the view of the 
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 May Hua MD, Ronald Munson PhD, Art Lucas, Susan Rovelstad MD, Mary Klingensmith MD, FACS, 
and Ira J. Kodner MD, FACS, “Medical Treatment of Jehovah‟s Witnesses,” Surgery 143 (April 2008) 
463-465. 
12
 The Witnesses also give medical reasons for refusing blood transfusions and have documented alleged 
risks from using blood products in the manual: Family Care and Medical Management for Jehovah’s 
Witnesses (New York: Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, 1992) 4.1-4.13; however, as far 
as I can tell, these reasons are secondary to the biblical commands.  
13
 Ruth Macklin, “The Inner Workings of an Ethics Committee: Latest Battle over Jehovah‟s Witnesses,” 
The Hastings Center Report 18 (Feb-Mar., 1988) 15. 
14
 Richard Singelenberg, “The Blood Transfusion Taboo of Jehovah‟s Witnesses: Origin, Development and 
Function of a Controversial Doctrine,” Social Science & Medicine 31 (1990) 520. 
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Society, apostate members belong to the realm of Satan. Though the transfusion 
might have been life-saving, the thought of a believer who once received blood 
from someone who is now in the devil‟s category is almost an obscenity within 
the Society‟s ideological schemes. Insiders, thus, can also defile, so an absolute 




While “pollution” may be the reason behind the requests of many JWs, it is not clear that 
this is the main reason.  For example, some JWs are even against auto-transfusion, in 
which a patient‟s own blood is taken out and given back to her.  JWs who are against this 
believe that once the connection to the body is severed, the blood should be thrown out.
16
 
Before 1960, JWs who accepted a blood transfusion only had to fear the eternal 
consequences for accepting a blood transfusion: separation from God (which is no small 
consequence).  However, that soon changed: “In the „Questions from Readers‟ part in the 
15 January, 1961 edition of The Watchtower, it was stated that the taking of a transfusion 
would be followed by excommunication (in the Society‟s jargon, „disfellowshipping‟).  If 
the offender would refuse to acknowledge his transgression or would persist in accepting 
or donating blood, he would be considered „a rebellious opposer and unfaithful example 
to fellow members‟ and therefore should be cut off from them.”
17
  The practice of 
disfellowshipping has attracted some attention in the Journal of Medical Ethics.  
Muramoto claims that current WTS practices amount to coercion and argues that the 
WTS could retain the controversial blood doctrine while instituting a don‟t-ask-don‟t-tell 
policy that would protect individual privacy and autonomy.
18
  Donald Ridley, a member 
of the WTS, responds:  
                                                 
15
 Singelenberg, 520. 
16
 Glenn Graber, from personal correspondence. 
17
 Singelenberg, 517. 
18
 See Muramoto (1998, 1999, 2000). 
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Muramoto essentially advances the anarchic notion that, after freely choosing to 
join an organisation because they have come to share or identify themselves with 
the organisation‟s basic values or objectives and after agreeing to abide by its 
rules and procedures, individuals should nevertheless be free to abandon those 
values and objectives and reject the organisation‟s rules and procedures but still 
insist that the organisation accept them as full and active members in good 




David Malyon, quoting The Watchtower, says, “As free moral agents, each one has 
personally decided to live by Bible standards.  These are decisions that fall within the 
framework of a way of life freely chosen… by potential Witnesses before they ever take 
the step of Christian [baptism]”
20
  Malyon continues: “Never is anyone disfellowshipped 
if he or she displays a repentant attitude, and happily a large number of those thus 
censured by this rarely used procedure, are eventually restored to our congregations.”
21
 
In spite of Ridley and Malyon‟s defense, Muramoto concerns are still pertinent:  
Ridley ignores hundreds of thousands who are members because they were raised 
by JW parents and baptised as minors.  They were indoctrinated from childhood 
into the religion with minimal exposure, if any to critical views.  It is sufficient to 
point out that the WTS strongly discouraged JW youths from seeking higher 
education until 1992, that they are today strongly discouraged from participating 
in internet forums, and that JW children are trained to recite their position on 
blood to doctors and judges. Where is the free will and full understanding of 
doctrine for these next generation JWs?
22
   
 
Muramoto also provides evidence that the WTS encourages the practice of shunning, the 
cutting off of personal ties with apostate friends or family members so that they will 
                                                 
19
 Donald T. Ridley, “Jehovah‟s Witnesses‟ Refusal of Blood: Obedience to Scripture and Religious 
Conscience” Journal of Medical Ethics 25 (1999) 471.  
20
 David Malyon, “Transfusion-free Treatment of Jehovah‟s Witnesses: Respecting the Autonomous 
Patient‟s Motives,” Journal of Medical Ethics 24 (1998) 377. 
21
 Malyon, 377. 
22
 Osamu Muramoto, “Medical Confidentiality and the Protection of Jehovah‟s Witnesses‟ Autonomous 





  This culture of excommunication may not preclude individual autonomy, but it 
does seem to hinder it.  
 
African Female Circumcision 
 
 Case: Annik 
 
Mr. G brings his 12-year-old daughter, Annik, to Dr. Jordan‟s office with the 
request that he [circumcise] her. Although traditionally [in Africa] the procecdure 
is performed without anesthesia or antiseptics, Mr. G says that he wants his 
daughter to have access to these, because he does not want her to suffer and wants 
her to be safe. Dr. Jordan does not find these concessions satisfactory, however. 
He believes that the practice, even with anesthesia, reflects an unacceptable 
disfigurement, repression, and control of women. Mr. G and his daughter insist 





 Female circumcision (also known as female genital mutilation or FGM) in Africa, 
occurs in twenty-eight countries and affects roughly 132 million women.  In Kenya, for 
example, “over 50 percent of the population…practices female circumcision, in some 
communities the percentage is as high as 90 percent.”
25
  Traditionally, the procedure is 
performed on girls between the ages of four and sixteen by “trained or untrained 
midwives, traditional healers, barbers, and occasionally doctors or nurses.”
26
   
There are three types of female circumcision: (1) clitoridectomy, in which all or 
part of the clitoris is removed; (2) excision, in which the clitoris and labia minora are 
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 Muramoto, “Medical Confidentiality,” 383-4. 
24
 From an in-class reflection assignment in Annette Mendola‟s bioethics course at the University of 
Tennessee, Fall 2006. 
25
 Mary Nyangweso Wangila, Female Circumcision: The Interplay of Religion, Culture, and Gender in 
Kenya (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2007) 8.  
26
 Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf, “Introduction: The Custom in Question,” in Female Circumcision: 




removed; and (3) infibulation, in which all of the genitalia are removed and the labia 
majora is sown mostly shut.  
 Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf describes the serious medical risks: “In addition to the 
immediate risks of bleeding, shock, and sepsis and the longer-term risks of infertility, 
infection, and obstructed labor, there is an increasing concern in medical circles that 
unsterilized instruments may be spreading the AIDS virus, particularly when group 
circumcisions are performed.”
27
  Infibulation has some of the most serious complications:   
The most common long-term complication was chronic urinary tract infection 
caused by the pooling of urine because of tight infibulation…Dysmenorrhoea is 
also prevalent; most Somali girls suffer lower abdominal pain during their 
monthly period because the very small opening prevents the normal, easy flow of 
vaginal secretions and menstrual fluid…In Somaliland and Djibouti, a midwife 
often does the de-infibulation at the time of marriage. In southern Somalia and in 
the Sudan, the husband is expected to perform this task by penile penetration. The 
attempt to deinfibulate the woman in this manner causes great pain, carries a risk 
of infection, and causes frustration for the couple. Sometimes the bride becomes 
pregnant while still completely infibulated, preventing vaginal exams and prenatal 
care and leading to further difficulties at the time of delivery. Many infibulated 
women experience prolonged labor at the second stage, which increases the risk 
to the mother and may harm the fetus…Medical personnel dealing with 
infibulated women indicate that the scarred area obstructs the delivery of the baby 
and in many cases severe perineal tears take place even if an anterior episiotomy 
is done. Serious complications include vesico-vaginal and recto-vaginal fistulae, 
abnormal openings between the vagina and the bladder or the vagina and the 
rectum that can cause urinary and fecal incontinence.
28
 
 The following reasons are given to justify the practice: (1) social status, (2) 
religion, (3) female hyper-sexuality, and (4) marriage.
29
  First, social status is a concern 
because girls who do not get circumcised are often stigmatized and ostracized:  
                                                 
27
 Abusharaf, 4. 
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 Raqiya D. Abdalla, “‟My Grandmother Called It the Three Feminine Sorrows‟: The Struggle of Women 
Against Female Circumcision in Somalia” in Female Circumcision: Multicultural Perspectives, ed. Rogaia 
Mustafa Abusharaf (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006) 191. 
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Female circumcision is viewed by most circumcising communities as an initiation 
into womanhood.  It ensures female fertility, provides a source of identity, and 
prescribes a social status; the lack of circumcision can lead to social exclusion and 
shunning.  Circumcision is perceived as a test of courage in preparation for the 
pain of childbirth, a sign of maturity, a source of respect among peers, and an 
honor for the girl‟s family.  In some communities it becomes a passport to 
marriage…The elaborate ceremonies such as songs, dances, chants, and teachings 
about wifely duties create immense social pressure to conform…Sooner or later 
[an uncircumcised girl] becomes an object of ridicule by her relatives and 
neighbors…Ridicule can become ostracism, preventing any communal support at 




The cultural ceremonies surrounding circumcision are often deeply entrenched.  For 
example, in Meru, Kenya, circumcision is followed by a week of seclusion, during which 
time the girl is subjected to moral and ancestral teachings.  After that, a large celebration 
is thrown; the family entertains relatives and friends and the parents show off their 
daughter and their wealth.
31
   
It is often the women of the society who defend the practice of circumcision 
because they have so much invested in their social status as wife and mother.  
Circumcision is a rite of passage for women in these cultures, and reaching womanhood 
is as much a social identity as it is an individual identity.  Esther Hicks says, “The social 
identity of the individual is defined, circumscribed and guaranteed by the authority of the 
community, and initiated by the relevant group.  In the case of females, it is the elder 
generation of women that initiates and carries out this ritual, and it is this privilege and 
authority that they decline to relinquish.”
32
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 Wangila, 100, 101. 
31
 Asha Mohamud, Samson Radeny, and Karin Ringheim, “Community-Based Efforts to End Female 
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 Esther K. Hicks, Infibulation: Female Mutilation in Islamic Northeastern Africa (New Brunswick, New 
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 Second, religion is often cited as a reason.  African culture is deeply religious, and 
Africans often perceive everything that happens in life in religious terms, whether the 
religion is indigenous religion, Islam, or Christianity.  The world is not divided into the 
secular and the sacred as it is in the West.  “In all undertakings – whether it be 
cultivating, sowing, harvesting, eating, traveling – religion is at work.  To be born into 
the African society is to be born into a culture that is intensely and pervasively religious 
and that means, and requires, participating in the religious beliefs and rituals of the 
community.”
33
  For example, when Kenyans reflect on their behavior, they consider 
everyone who will be affected: friends, family, and the spirits of the departed.
34
  Their 
worldview includes the supernatural, and they think that a full understanding of human 
well-being requires a consideration of mystical forces.  When a Kenyan suffers from a 
disease, it is not enough to give a medical explanation.  As Mary Nyangweso Wangila 
says, “Possible actions of witches, sorcerers, ancestral spirits, or gods must be eliminated 
before normal life can resume.  Because reason alone cannot encompass every aspect of 
truth, arguments about practices such as female circumcision that maintain they are 
unnecessary or unnatural are doomed to fail.”
35
  Wangila calls this a belief in double 
causality; illnesses may have natural and supernatural causes.  Even a botched female 
circumcision that results in the death of the girl may be explained in terms of the victim‟s 
moral misconduct.  “The circumciser may disclaim responsibility by claiming that the 
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victim‟s parents committed adultery or that her grandparents or someone else in the 
family violated a taboo.”
36
 
 The teachings of Islam are sometimes cited to justify the practice.  The Koran 
does not talk about female circumcision; however, some Muslims refer to the teachings 
of the Hadith (the collection of Muhammad‟s teachings) that sanctions Abraham‟s 
circumcision (and by extension the circumcision of all males and females) and mentions 
a discussion held between Muhammad and a female circumciser in which Muhammad 
allegedly endorsed the practice.
37
  Muslims who do not circumcise contest this 
interpretation.  In addition, some fatwas (authoritative edicts of Muslim leaders) have 
been issued endorsing circumcision, but equally other fatwas have been issued 
condemning the practice.
38
  Wangila says, “Conflicting opinions on the subject of female 
circumcision among Muslims explains why some Muslims hold to this practice, while 
others oppose it; female circumcision has an ambiguous link to religious duty that results 




 Christianity is also cited as requiring female circumcision.  Although it is not 
mentioned in the Bible (and Christians have historically been the one religious group 
most opposed to the practice), some Christians infer that Abraham‟s circumcision is the 
model for both males and females.  As one of Wangila‟s female informants says, “Since 
Abraham was circumcised as a sign of his faith in God, we also should emulate him if we 
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want to be righteous before God as he was.”
40
  African Initiated Churches (AICs) 
emerged as a reaction to Western colonialism, and they taught a form of Christianity that 
was compatible with traditional African culture (Christianity without European 
adornments).  AICs are syncretistic, and they support a number of traditional practices 
not found in Christianity elsewhere such as polygamy and female circumcision. 
Third, circumcision is thought to be a means to control female sexuality.  
Uncircumcised girls are thought to be unclean, promiscuous, and hyper-active sexually.  
The removal of the clitoris especially, but also infibulation, is thought to remove sexual 
desire and protect a girl‟s virginity.  In one survey in Kenya, males said they would not 
marry an uncircumcised female because “uncircumcised partners tend to seek divorce 
more easily since they are more independent.”
41
  A woman‟s “oversexed nature” is a 
threat to her husband, her family and to herself.  As one villager said: “A woman is like a 
plough-animal; she has no honor,” and as such, she can dishonor her husband unless strict 
standards are followed.
42
  Although circumcision is not a guaranteed way to preserve a 
girl‟s virginity, combined with a strict code of modesty and seclusion, it can provide a 
“powerful physical and psychological deterrent to illicit sexual activities.”
43
  In a survey 
of Kenyan females, all of the respondents (50) shared this sentiment.  In other words, the 
women agreed that circumcision controls female sexuality.  “Kenya‟s Rendile people, for 
example, believe that circumcision will reduce a wife‟s sexual desire and help her to 
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control her sexual desire during the often long absences of a husband who may be away 
for months at a time caring for animals in the bush or working in a larger town.”
44
   
 Fourth, circumcision is often justified as a prerequisite for marriage.  For one, 
circumcised girls are thought to make better wives.  In one study, men perceived 
uncircumcised women as “oversexed, unclean, rude, bossy, and disrespectful.”
45
  Second, 
finding a good wife for a son (or having an eligible daughter) is highly valuable.  One 
African proverb says, “A good wife is more precious than gold.”
46
  Another says, “A 
good wife is wealth.”
47
  These proverbs speak not only to the honor that a good wife 
brings her husband, but also to the generous dowry she will bring her parents.  
Infibulation is thought of as one way to protect a girl until marriage.  The hijab (or veil) 
acts in much the same way, symbolically protecting the female from the world outside.  
Infibulation is an act of covering, and so protects the area of reproduction from the world.  
Traditionally, there were two kinds of women: the protected and the unprotected.  
“Mernissi has pointed out that women in early Islamic society were divided into two 
categories: those who were free, and protected from violence and those who were slaves, 
and were not…. Any woman who did not belong to a tribe and have the protection of a 
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Orthodox Judaism and End of Life Care 
Case: Samuel Golubchuk 
Mr. Golubchuck
49
 was an elderly Jewish man admitted to [the] hospital with 
pneumonia and hypertension with a pre-existing brain injury that left him with 
minimal brain function. His illness was so severe that he was soon transferred to 
the ICU and intubated. There were few if any signs that he would recover. In 
horrifying terms Mr. Golubchuck‟s physicians argued that to keep him on life 
support was “torture” due to his increasingly complicated care, whereas his family 
argued that to take him off life support was tantamount to “murder” according to 
their Orthodox Jewish beliefs….In a striking move, Mr. Golubchuck‟s attending 
physician resigned his position at the hospital over the case, followed by two 
other intensivists who refused shifts in the ICU, arguing that to continue to treat 
Mr. Golubchuck was a violation of their medical ethics and their prima facie duty 
to “do no harm.” The physician graphically described that keeping Mr. 
Golubchuck from his natural death required surgical “hacking away” at his 
bedsores at the bedside in order to keep his infection at bay. Without reasonable 
hope of benefit the physician characterized this kind of treatment as “assault” and 
a “grotesque abomination”…Instead, Mr. Golubchuck was cared for by substitute 
physicians and remained on life support for a total of seven and a half months. All 
the while his family never stopped pleading the medical duty to act according to 
his Orthodox Jewish beliefs. Mr. Golubchuck died while expert neurologists 





Orthodox Judaism emphasizes the sanctity of life and strongly prohibits the 
shortening of anyone‟s life.  Fred Rosner, an Orthodox Jew, writes: “In Judaism every 
human being is considered to be of supreme and infinite value.  It is the obligation of 
individuals and society to preserve, hallow, and dignify human life to care for the total 
needs of all persons so that they can be healthy and productive members of society.”
51
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The sanctity of life, he claims, is so important that it virtually trumps all other values.
52
  
While discussing the Terri Schiavo case, Rosner says, “Euthanasia in any form is 
condemned as an act of murder; shortening a person‟s life by even a moment is 
tantamount to murder.  The removal of Terri Schiavo‟s feeding tube was wrong in that it 
would inevitably shorten her life and thus constitutes an act of murder.”
53
 
 Rosner cites the following reasons to support his claims.  First, the Bible teaches 
that human beings were created in the image of God, which means that human life has 
supreme value.
54
  Second, the Bible strongly prohibits murder: 
In Exodus 20:13, it is stated: “And if a man come presumptuously upon his 
neighbor, to slay him with guile; thou shalt take him from Mine altar, that he may 
die.”  In Leviticus 24:17, there is the phrase “And he that smiteth any man 
mortally shall surely be put to death” and four sentences later we find again… 
“And he that killeth a man shall be put to death.”  In Numbers 35:30, it is stated, 
“Whoso killeth any person, the murderer shall be slain at the mouth of witnesses” 
…Finally in Deuteronomy 5:17, the sixth commandment of the Decalogue is 
repeated: “Thou shalt not kill.” Thus, in every book of the Pentateuch, we find at 




Third, euthanasia is also prohibited in the Bible.  In I Samuel 31:1-6 and II Samuel 1:5-
10, the story of Saul‟s death is told.  It says that during a battle that went badly for Israel, 
Saul was afraid and asked his armor-bearer to kill him with the sword.  The armor-bearer 
refused, so Saul fell upon his own sword.  Later, David was asking a witness how he 
learned of Saul‟s death, and the witness said he came upon Saul impaled on his spear.  
Saul asked the man to finish him off, which he proceeded to do.  David, then, put the 
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witness to death, it is assumed, for an act of unjustified euthanasia.
56
  Fourth, euthanasia 
is also prohibited in the Talmudic sources.  For example, Rosner writes: 
The Mishnah states as follows (Semachot 1:1): “One who is in a dying condition 
(gosses) is regarded as a living person in all respects.”  The Mishnah continues 
(Semachot 1:2 to 4): … “One may not move him nor may one place him on sand 
nor on salt until he dies.  One may not close the eyes of the dying person.  He who 
touches them or moves them is shedding blood because Rabbi Meir used to say: 
„This can be compared to a flickering flame.  As soon as a person touches it, it 
becomes extinguished.  So too, whosoever closes the eyes of the dying is 
considered to have taken his soul.”  The fifth century Babylonian Talmud 
(Shabbat 151b) mentions as follows: “He who closes the eyes of a dying person 




 Orthodox Judaism makes a moral distinction between withdrawing and 
withholding life support to terminally ill patients.  The latter is permissible, but the 
former is not (unless judged “heroic”).  The trouble for Jewish patients and family 
members is that if they start treatment, they are obligated to continue treatment until the 
“bitter end.”  One Jewish scholar suggests a work-around for this problem: “connecting 
the ventilator at the time of intubation for patients with unclear medical conditions to a 
timer; if after comprehensive workup and clinical observation over the period of the timer 
the patient does not improve, the timer would not be reset.”
58
  This solution would allow 
the patient‟s condition to end her life without having to withdraw life support.  Benjamin 
Gesundheit, et. al. says that in certain cases withdrawing might be permissible: “There is 
no obligation to artificially prolong life with heroic intervention in the ongoing process of 
dying and, under such conditions… even cessation of treatment (but not active induction 
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of death!) might be approved or even demanded by Jewish law.”
59
  However, the key 
term here is “heroic,” for it seems that there will be a wide difference of opinion about 
what counts as heroic when Judaism takes such a strong stand on the sanctity of life.   
Recently, The American Journal of Bioethics published a target article based on 
the Golubchuk case: “The Case of Samuel Golubchuk and the Right to Live.”
60
  The 
authors, Alan Jotkowitz, Shimon Glick and Ari Z. Zivotofsky, tell how the College of 
Physicians and Surgeons of Manitoba released a statement at the time of the case 
(Golubchuk was from Manitoba, Canada).  The statement says that physicians have the 
final say whether to withdraw life support even if the patient and family disagree.  
According to the statement,  
“The criterion for maintaining life support is the ability of the patients to recover 
to a level at which they are aware of themselves, their environment, and their 
existence. If the family disagrees with this decision to terminate life support, the 
physician must consult with another physician. If the consulted physician agrees, 
therapy may be withdrawn over the objections of the patient/proxy/representative. 
Even if the minimum therapeutic goal is achievable, but the physician concludes 
nevertheless that life-sustaining therapy should be withdrawn, and he or she 
obtains a consultant‟s agreement, the physician may withdraw life support over 
the express opposition of the patient/proxy/representative, if the family is given 




Jotkowitz, Glick and Zivotofsky criticize the statement arguing that it (1) violates patient 
autonomy, (2) lacks cultural sensitivity, (3) promotes the erosion of respect for life, and 
(4) overlooks the fact that physician predictions are often wrong. 
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 Case: Pamela Hamilton 
The Church of God of the Union Assembly in Lafollette, Tennessee had as one of 
their tenets in 1983: “All members of the church are forbidden to use medicine, 
vaccinations or shots of any kind but are taught by the church to live by faith.”
62
  
This belief led to a confrontation when 12-year-old Pamela Hamilton, a member 
of this community, was diagnosed with Ewing‟s Sarcoma that year.  Dr. Frank 
Haraf, an oncologist, became alarmed when Pamela did not return for treatment 
because he was certain that she would die within three months unless treated.  
Larry Hamilton, Pamela‟s father, said, “If you‟ve got a Chevrolet, you wouldn‟t 
take it to Ford to get it repaired, would you?  Just like your body, God made you.  
Why take it to an off-brand to get something done to it.  Just believe on him to get 
it done and he‟ll take care of you.”
63
  Pamela shared her father‟s beliefs and 
refused treatment, but the Court of Appeals invoked parens patriae and ordered 
her to be admitted immediately for treatment, which was effective; however, 




 Faith healing is a broad category.  It could refer to the power of positive thinking, 
mind over matter, or belief in miracles.  It might not preclude standard medical treatment 
(as when hospital patients are prayed for), or it might mean refusing treatment (as in the 
case of Pamela Hamilton).  For my purpose here, I will limit the scope of faith healing to 
beliefs in miracles that result in refusal to receive standard medical treatment or in 
demands to continue care deemed futile.  
 However, this raises another question: what is a miracle?  Some use the word 
“miracle” loosely such as in describing a “miracle drug.”  Others use the word to describe 
surprising medical results.  As Cindy Hylton Rushton and Kathleen Russell write:  
For example, health care professionals may use the language of miracles to 
describe events that defy scientific and medical predictions.  In this view, miracles 
are based on care that is accomplished through technology and human 
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engineering.  For instance, critical care professionals may label situations where 
the patient survives when all else fails as the “PICU Save” and claim a miracle 
has occurred.  From their perspective, such situations represent an event where the 
expertise of the health care professionals and their technology contributed to 




These definitions above do not include a supernatural component, so I will set them 
aside.  David Hume is thought to have given the standard philosophical definition of a 
“miracle.”  He says that a miracle is defined as “a violation of a law of nature.”
66
  
However, he is ambiguous on the point because he also says that a miracle is “a violation 
of a law of nature by a Deity or invisible agent.”
67
  The presence of these two definitions 
in the same work have confounded Hume‟s interpreters, but I think that the second is 
more applicable here.  Nevertheless, I do not think that a miracle should be conceived of 
as a “violation” of a law of nature because it is not compatible with how many traditional 
theistic believers conceive of God‟s relationship with creation, which is as the author and 
sustainer of the laws of nature, not as violator.  For this reason, I will define a miracle as 
divine intervention in the normal course of events (laws of nature).  
 Pamela Hamilton and her community relied on faith healing and were hoping for 
a cure, but they also were resigned to it being Pamela‟s “time” if God so willed.  
Although it is cases like Pamela‟s that make the news, it is not only obscure cult-like 
groups that believe in miracles.  Robert Orr describes a case in which a Pentecostal 
family makes an M-request:  
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Before this four-month-old boy was born with Down‟s syndrome and complex 
anomalies of his heart, his devout Pentecostal parents named him after an Old 
Testament patriarch.  He had had four surgical interventions in an effort to 
prolong his life, but he was now in multi-organ failure with no reasonable 
likelihood of survival.  For the preceding two weeks, his bedside nurses had urged 
his physicians to persuade his parents to withdraw life support so that his 
suffering might cease.  When the surgeon approached the family with this strong 
recommendation, they refused to consider withdrawal of life-support.  They said 
that God had spoken to his mother through scripture references which contained 
the patient‟s first name, and in this manner had promised her that he would get 




Many mainstream Christians, and not just Pentecostals, believe God still speaks and heals 
today, so it is not uncommon that Christians will make requests based on a personal 
revelation from God.   
Christian Science has received much attention for its hostile stance toward 
traditional medicine.  Its followers are taught to pursue healing through prayer, not 
through traditional medicine: “For Christian Scientists, the power of prayer is superior to 
standard medical treatment.  The solicitation of medical care demonstrates weakness of 
faith.  Corroborative evidence for the success of spiritual healing is provided through 
member testimonials by the recently cured and supported by at least three other church 
members present during the patient‟s recovery.  Since 1900, Christian Scientists have 
reported over 53,000 healings from many diseases.”
69
  
 Christian Science teaches its followers to acquire a spiritual consciousness like 
Jesus; it was this spiritual understanding of reality that enabled Jesus to heal illnesses.  
Followers are taught that reality is spiritual and that once this spiritual awareness is 
acquired, so-called physical healing will result.  Allison W. Phinney, Jr. writes: 
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“Christian Science treatment could not possibly heal as it does if everything were as 
solidly material as it appears.  But since it isn‟t, and what we see and experience so 
vividly and sometimes painfully is a subjective mental impression, this fear and false 




 Nevertheless, Christian Science treatments do not always work.  Kenneth Hickey 
and Laurie Lyckholm describe the following case:  
In late Fall of 1992, James Andrew Wantland (Andrew), a twelve-year-old 
seventh grader in La Habra, California began to experience lethargy, weight loss, 
and frequent urination. Andrew began to complain to his father and paternal 
grandmother about his symptoms on or about December 14, 1992. His father, a 
Christian Scientist, felt his son‟s symptoms were transient and made little attempt 
to address the issue. By December 17, 1992, Andrew was emaciated, vomiting, 
and eating little. His father contacted a Christian Science practitioner who 
provided healing prayer without actually coming to see Andrew. By December 
20, 1992, Andrew experienced altered mental status and total exhaustion. A 
Christian Science nurse was called to the family home. Upon her arrival, Andrew 
was making no eye contact, was unresponsive, and had rapid, deep respirations. 
At this time, Andrew‟s father decided to abandon spiritual healing and called 911. 
Andrew was transported to the nearest hospital and was pronounced dead. The 





Christian Science “practitioners” and “nurses” are trained in the ways of their founder, 
Mary Baker Eddy.  These ways do not include the basics of medical science, but they 
include “bathing, making beds, wound care, and bandaging, and supporting the patient‟s 
own prayer.”
72
  Also, while most forms of medical treatment are opposed, not all forms 
are.  These include: “orthopedic and dental treatments…as well as supportive equipment 
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such as eyeglasses, crutches, and hearing aids.”
73
  In addition, the practice of praying for 
sick individuals over the phone is common, so Andrew‟s case is typical even if the 




 In this chapter, I have examined four common cases: M-requests made by 
Jehovah‟s Witnesses, some African communities, Orthodox Jews, and religions that 
believe in faith healing.  In each case, I have explored the practices and traditions of the 
communities involved and the reasons given to defend the M-requests.  
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Liberty of Conscience and the Standard of Care 
 
      In this chapter, I examine the liberty of conscience and its limits, showing that 
respect for matters of conscience is an important principle.  Second, I explore the 
standard of care, the clinical point of view, to best understand the reasons for the conflict 
between matters of conscience and the clinic.  Next, I consider three unsatisfying or 
incomplete approaches to handling M-requests, setting the stage for a phronesis-based 
proposal.  
 
The Liberty of Conscience 
 The human conscience is the faculty that reflects on questions of morality, 
meaning, and the good life, and decides, for each person, what the answers to these 
questions are.  The liberty of conscience is the notion that the conscience needs to be free 
from interference to act effectively.  This liberty is enshrined in the First Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”  The first part is known as the 
Establishment Clause, which is interpreted as saying that the government should not 
show preference to a religion; the second part is known as the Free Exercise Clause, 
which is interpreted as meaning that citizens are free to believe what they want and free 
to act on their beliefs. 
 In Liberty of Conscience, Martha Nussbaum describes six normative principles 
that are recognized by the First Amendment.
74
  First, the Equality Principle is the 
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principle that citizens have equal rights under the law.  As Nussbaum says, “we want not 
just enough freedom, but a freedom that is itself equal, and that is compatible with all 
citizens being fully equal and being equally respected by the society in which they 
live.”
75
 Because of this principle, the liberty of conscience is sometimes called “the equal 
liberty of conscience,” emphasizing the fact that conscience is common to all citizens and 
needs to be equally protected.   
Second, the Respect-Conscience Principle recognizes the important role 
conscience plays as the faculty that determines life‟s meaning.  Nussbaum, expounding 
on Roger Williams‟ defense of religious liberty, says: “Conscience…is the dignity of the 
person; it is, indeed, the person himself.   So: everyone has inside something infinitely 
precious, something that demands respect from us all, and something in regard to which 
we are all basically equal.”
76
  This principle also recognizes that in any society, especially 
a pluralistic one, there are diverse commitments of conscience and that each one, being 
infinitely valuable, should be respected.   
Third, the Liberty Principle says that if we are to respect conscience, it must be 
adequately free with respect to constraints so that it can function properly.  Nussbaum 
says, “Understanding what conscience is like and what it needs, we see that it requires 
substantial (and equal) religious liberty, including liberty of belief and speech, liberty of 
religious practice (within limits set by the rights of others), and the liberty of religious 
bodies to organize their own affairs (again within some limits).”
77
  In describing the 
nature of the conscience, John Locke describes how we cannot force someone to believe 
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something: “[The conscience] cannot be compelled to the belief of any thing by outward 
force.  Confiscation of estate, imprisonment, torments, nothing of that nature can have 




Fourth, the Accommodation Principle says that in some cases, in order to respect 
conscience, religious citizens should be exempt from generally applicable laws, which 
means that occasionally the protection of conscience can trump the interests of the state.  
For example, in time of war, some citizens should be exempt from military service.  As 
George Washington wrote to Quaker conscientious objectors in 1789: “I assure you very 
explicitly, that in my opinion the conscientious scruples of all men should be treated with 
great delicacy and tenderness: and it is my wish and desire, that the laws may always be 
as extensively accommodated to them, as a due regard for the protection and essential 
interests of the nation may justify and permit.”
79
  A recent case in Florida challenged this 
principle: a Muslim woman was not permitted to wear her veil in her driver‟s license 
photograph.  She took her case to court, but lost.  The court ruled that there was a 
compelling state interest in having uncovered faces on identification cards.
80
  While this 
may have been a reasonable ruling, consider another recent case involving Muslim dress: 
on April 11, 2011, France outlawed entirely the wearing of the Muslim burqa.  French 
President Sarkozy said, “The veils are an assault on French values of secularism and 
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equality of the sexes…the burqa isolate(s) women and take(s) away their humanity.”
81
  
Another French official said, “You can‟t have things like men and women refusing to 
shake each other‟s hands, and separate hours for boys and girls at the public swimming 
pool. That‟s just not France.”
82
  The French ban seems to be based entirely on the values 
of unity and conformity, but unless it can be shown that essential interests are at stake, it 
seems that the ban constitutes an unjust infringement of religious liberty.  
Fifth, the Nonestablishment Principle says that the state should not show 
preference to a religion because doing so would violate the Equality Principle and the 
Respect-Conscience Principle.  Nussbaum explains why religious establishment is wrong: 
(1) It will encourage religious political competition (factionalism), (2) the state will 
interfere with the internal affairs of religion, (3) it may be difficult for the state to avoid 
coercing its citizens, and (4) it undermines equality since the establishment suggests that 
outsiders are not equal members of the community.
83
  Many countries do not support this 
principle, for example, England, which recognizes an official church, and Iran, which 
recognizes only Shia Islam.  This principle was hotly contested in the U.S. in 2001 when 
Chief Justice Roy Moore was fired for resisting the order to remove a monument of the 
Ten Commandments from an Alabama judicial building.   
Finally, the Separation Principle says that to some degree, church and state must 
be separate in order to respect most of the principles already listed, especially the 
Establishment Principle.  If the state is to remain neutral with regards to religion, then 
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there must be some degree of separation between the two realms.  John Locke argues: 
“The church itself is a thing absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth.  
The boundaries on both sides are fixed and immoveable.  He jumbles heaven and earth 
together, the things most remote and opposite, who mixes these societies, which are in 
their original, end, business, and in every thing, perfectly distinct, and infinitely different 
from each other.”
84
  This is not, as some think, to promote secularism as the state 
“religion;” this would also be a violation of both the Equality and Establishment 
Principles, nor is it a total separation.  As Nussbaum remarks: “Imagine what it would be 
like if the fire department refused to aid a burning church, if churches didn‟t have access 
to the public water supply or the sewer system, if the police would not investigate crimes 
on church property, if clergy could not vote or run for office.  Such proposals seem 
horribly unfair, because the state is providing all these forms of support for everyone 
else.”
85
  The actual degree of separation is determined by the minimum requirements of 
the principles above. 
Of course, there are limits to the liberty of conscience.  Traditionally, those limits 
have been framed in terms of the avoidance of harm; in other words, conscience should 
be free unless the exercise of conscience will result in harm to others.  Violating the 
rights of others and disturbing the peace may also be limits to this liberty. 
 Should liberty of conscience extend to the clinic?  Most certainly it should.  If 
citizens should be free to hold beliefs and act on those beliefs, it would be unnatural to 
limit such freedoms to certain areas of public life.  It is in the clinic, moreover, where 
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citizens, as patients, come face to face with their deepest beliefs, and it would be callous 
to deprive them of this basic liberty when it matters most.  As Christopher Meyers 
explains: “Hospital stays are rarely good times and religion provides great support and 
comfort to many patients and their families.  Religious beliefs also closely inform 
patients‟ and surrrogates‟ choices; every clinician has repeatedly heard the request, 
„Please give Mom just a few more days while we pray for a miracle.‟”
86
  In addition, 
religious beliefs are an important part of patient well-being.  David B. Larson and Susan 
S. Larson discuss patient survey data and studies in which patients view their religion as 
important to coping with illness, depression, and stress.  Harold G Koenig et al. write: 
Religious beliefs and practices reduce the sense of loss of control and helplessness 
that accompanies physical illness.  Religious beliefs provide a cognitive 
framework that can reduce suffering and increase one‟s purpose and meaning in 
the face of loss of other previously relied-upon sources of self-esteem.  Private 
religious activities such as prayer reduce the sense of isolation and increase the 
patient‟s sense of control over the illness.  Praying to God may not only relieve 
the patient‟s loneliness, but belief in an all-powerful, loving, and responsive God 
can give patients the sense that they can influence their own condition by possibly 
influencing God to act on their behalf.  Public religious behaviors that improve 
coping during times of physical illness include participating in worship services, 
praying with others (and having others pray for one‟s health), being visited by 




Caring for patients holistically (their general well-being) requires respecting their 
religious beliefs.  However, some may rightly point out that respecting conscience in the 
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The Standard of Care 
 
 The standard of care is a legal concept that sets the minimum for physician 
conduct.  George J. Annas says, “[the] standard is generally defined simply as what a 
reasonably prudent physician (or specialist) would do in the same or similar 
circumstances.”
88
  Le Puma et al. describe two components of the standard of care: (1) 
what is medically indicated and (2) what is legally required.  Le Puma et al. relate the 
first component to Aristotle‟s notion of techne, or technical knowledge.  They say, “Once 
clinical practice or clinical trials prove a treatment to be beneficial and better than 
alternative therapies, it becomes the standard of care.  A medical procedure is „indicated‟ 
when it has proved to be efficacious.”
89
  They relate the second component to Aristotle‟s 




While Annas‟ definition above is sufficient for my purposes here, it should be 
pointed out that the term is subject to debate.  As Harvey J. Blumenthal and John R. 
Woodard explain, the term is not used carefully: “[the standard of care] is a legal concept 
which increasingly is found in medical writings, often without being defined.”
91
  They 
show that authors may use the term for impact, just to give authority to their 
recommendations.  Some articles, they explain, use the term in the title, but offer only 
“guidelines,” which is confusing since “guidelines” sounds much weaker than 
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“standards.”  Also, the concept varies slightly from state to state.  For example, 
Massachusetts law defines the standard of care as “the care that the average qualified 
physician would provide,”
92
 and Kansas law defines it in terms of best judgment: 
“Where, under the usual practice of the profession of the defendant, different courses of 
treatment are available which might reasonably be used, the specialist has a right to use 
his best judgment in the selection of the choice of treatment.  However, the selection 
must be consistent with the skill and care which other specialists practicing in the same 
field of expertise would use in similar circumstances.”
93
 
 The standard of care is grounded in evidence-based medicine.  Marcia Angell, 
who was the executive editor of The New England Journal of Medicine, describes the 
evidence-based approach: “Perhaps the most important hallmark of science is its utter 
reliance on evidence.  Furthermore, the evidence must be objectively verifiable.  This 
reliance on concrete evidence distinguishes science from all other human 
endeavors…Medical conclusions are no different from other scientific matters, because 
the body is a part of nature.”
94
   
This approach to medicine has its critics, especially in the supporters of 
complementary and alternative medicine (CAM).  Angell has defended evidence-based 
medicine against charges of establishment bias from CAM supporters arguing that good 
evidence “must offer a plausible biological mechanism for effects reported.”
95
  Such 
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evidence apparently rules out CAM treatments such as homeopathy, moxibustion, and 
intercessory prayer.  David J. Hufford explains that the evidence-based approach is 
connected to what he calls the theoretical plausibility criterion: 
The theoretical plausibility criterion asserts that (1) all valid knowledge will prove 
to be coherent (that is, to follow logically without inconsistencies or gaps) with 
some characteristics of established contemporary science (known biological 
mechanisms in Dr. Angell‟s instance), and (2) that the likelihood that a claim will 
eventually have this coherent relation to contemporary science can be judged on 




Hufford‟s analysis of the theoretical plausibility criterion produces the following 
components:  
 
(a) Existing conventional scientific knowledge is an adequate measure of whether an 
unconventional claim is true.  
 
(b) Empirical evidence of an event that is not theoretically plausible can be rejected 
out of hand.  
 
(c) If a practice lacks theoretical plausibility there is no reason to think that it may 
work. 
 
(d) Acceptance of theoretically implausible claims would require the abandonment of 
current scientific knowledge.  
 
(e) There is no such thing as CAM, there is just medicine that is supported by solid 




Hufford rightly questions each of these components, claiming that they represent expert 
paternalism and infringe on the process of free inquiry.  However, I do not have the space 
here to explore his argument.    
 Grounded, as it is, in evidence-based medicine, the standard of care may, at times, 
conflict with the liberty of conscience, but it does not follow that the standard of care 
should run roughshod over commitments of conscience.  The liberty of conscience, as a 
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prima facie right, means that we seriously consider  M-requests that violate the standard 
of care, which is in keeping with the Respect-Conscience and Accommodation principles.  
 Some might object that this fails to take seriously the consciences of health care 
providers, who are just as much worthy of respect.  There are two parts to this objection: 
(1) the standard of care is something like a professional conscience, and it would be a 
violation of this professional conscience to honor an M-request;
98
 and (2) caregivers have 
their own personal convictions, some of which are based on religious beliefs, and it 
would be insensitive to require them to act contrary to their own consciences (this 
broaches the topic of conscience clauses in health care).  I do not have the space here to 
respond in depth to these concerns, but to say that in the current patient-centered 
environment where patient autonomy is heralded as the highest value, the conscience of 
the patient naturally comes first.  Physicians are bearers of conscience too, but they are 
representatives of a professional institution, one that is meant to serve the public, and the 
liberty of conscience was meant to protect individual religious convictions, not matters of 
professional conduct (although those are important too).  Also, enough has been said 
about conscience clauses in the literature to provide, I believe, enough accommodation to 




However, this is not to advocate some kind of moral relativism. Liberty of 
conscience is not an absolute.  If it were an absolute, it could be used to justify atrocious 
acts such as the Jonestown massacre when, in 1978, Jim Jones instructed his followers to 
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consume a cyanide-laced drink.  Parents were to give it first to their children and then lie 
down and die next to them in a mass murder-suicide.  Religious liberty cannot vindicate 
such actions.  Ruth Macklin argues, “It is one thing to require that cultural, religious, and 
ethnic groups be treated as equals; that conforms to the principle of justice as equality.  It 
is quite another thing to say that any cultural practice whatsoever of any group is to be 
tolerated and respected equally.  This latter view is a statement of extreme ethical 
relativism.”
99
  Macklin is right to want to avoid this type of relativism.   
However, Macklin argues against what she calls “respect for tradition,” which she 
considers is simply a “convenient injunction for people in power – usually defenders of 
the status quo – to keep the system that sustains their power intact.”
100
  She thinks that 
such a maxim may serve anthropologists well in the field, but it is not an ethical principle 
that can justify a cultural practice.  She says that it is possible that one might show 
respect for tradition on utilitarian grounds on occasion, but one need not respect tradition 
for its own sake. She says, 
It might be argued that respect for tradition could be considered part of respect for 
autonomy, but that maneuver will not stand up to ethical scrutiny.  Application of 
the principle “respect for autonomy” cannot require that any actions whatever that 
flow from the capacity for self-determination must be judged ethically acceptable.  
People who engage in political torture, commit domestic violence, and sterilize 
people without their consent may all be acting autonomously, but they do not 
deserve respect.  The same is true for traditions that individuals or a cultural 
group autonomously accept and adhere to.  Some traditional practices are 
harmful, even evil, some are beneficial, and others are ethically neutral.  The mere 
fact that it is a “tradition” says nothing about the moral value that should be 
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attached to it.  Just as laws maybe be enacted, criticized, or overturned for ethical 




In short, tradition is not valuable in itself, according to Macklin, and respecting tradition 
is not a normative principle on par with other principles like autonomy, beneficence, 
nonmaleficence, and justice.  
Macklin uses the case of African female circumcision as an example.  She notes 
that anthropologists who defend (or do not adamantly oppose) the practice do so for a 
number of reasons: (1) out of cultural sensitivity, (2) out of concern that criticism will 
only more deeply entrench the practice, and (3) out of the desire to avoid appearances of 
cultural imperialism.
102
  She says that the mutilation of female genitals is a brutal 
violation of women‟s rights, and the practice violates the principle of nonmaleficence.  
No appeal to respect for tradition can justify the practice.  
While I do agree with Macklin‟s conclusion about female circumcision, she is 
mistaken about the way to arrive there.  She seems to think that the standard principles of 
biomedical ethics are sufficient.  She tells a story of teaching the principles to a group of 
cross-cultural workers: “I stated and explicated the principles of nonmaleficence, 
beneficence, respect for persons, and prominent principles of justice.  When I had 
finished, one participant asked: „Are these the only fundamental ethical 
principles?‟…Turning the challenge back to them, I asked if they could provide examples 
of candidates for coequal principles.  One person proposed „respect for tradition.‟  Never 
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Macklin concludes that respect for tradition should not qualify as an ethical 
principle.  On the face of it, she seems right, but if tradition is a part of culture, and 
culture is a part of our identity, then tradition is worthy of respect – if for no other reason 
than it is derivative from respect for persons.  Respect for tradition can also be conceived 
as a component of the principle “respect for conscience” (or Respect-Conscience 
Principle), which can also be shown to be closely linked to the principle of respect for 
persons.  To respect people is to respect them as bearers of conscience, as Nussbaum 
argues above.   
Contrary to what some might say, the principle of autonomy is compatible with 
receiving one‟s beliefs from tradition, culture, and religion.  As Beauchamp and 
Childress explain, “No fundamental inconsistency exists between autonomy and 
authority, because individuals can exercise their autonomy in choosing to accept an 
institution, tradition, or community that they view as a legitimate source of direction.  
Having welcomed the authority of his or her religious institution, a Jehovah‟s Witness 
can refuse a recommended blood transfusion…That we share moral principles in no way 
prevents them from being our principles.”
104
  There is a philosophical conundrum here 
that might be expressed in the dilemma: “autonomy today or autonomy tomorrow?”  It is 
not entirely clear how we can protect our autonomy tomorrow if we surrender to 
authority today.  If we second-guess the same authority at every turn, have we really 
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  This concern is valid and probably indicates a nonvirtuous 
epistemic practice that should be avoided (call it total-epistemic-surrender).  
Nevertheless, I think a middle ground can be staked out.  There is an autonomy 
somewhere between total epistemic surrender and absolute independence that is in 
keeping with proper epistemic functioning.  Anyway, a view of autonomy that precludes 
a patient from adopting the moral views of others in her community is unrealistic; it 
overemphasizes the value of individualism and overlooks the social nature of belief 
acquisition.   
To reiterate, this respect for conscience does not amount to moral relativism: it is 
not to say that conscience (or autonomy as Macklin recognizes) trumps everything, but 
the liberty of conscience is a fundamental right.  What Macklin overlooks, at a minimum, 
is the virtue of cultural sensitivity.  Even the authors of Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 
the source of the principles she defends, recognize now that the bioethical principles 
alone are not sufficient as a guide for medical practice.  Professionals, they say, need to 
cultivate moral virtues in their characters in order to cultivate good judgment, and 
arguably, cultural sensitivity is one of those virtues insofar as it considers patients‟ 
background beliefs and respects the patients‟ commitments of conscience.  Macklin‟s 
analysis of the female circumcision case omits any serious reflection on the reasons a 
group might have to engage in such a practice, choosing, instead, to only consider non-
religious reasons and factors such as harm, coercion, and sexual misinformation.  She 
jumps to an examination of the practice in terms of the principles of bioethics, but she 
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does so without taking the cultural background seriously; hence, I find her approach to be 
culturally insensitive.   
 
Carter and Klugman’s Approach 
 
Macklin‟s approach avoids moral relativism, but at the cost of being culturally 
insensitive.  Michele A. Carter and Craig M. Klugman propose a model for clinical ethics 
consultations called “Cultural Engagement,” which touts cultural understanding over the 
resolution of moral conflict.
106
  They are committed to multiculturalism, which means 
“that a person understands, appreciates, and values his or her own culture, but in addition 
has an informed respect and curiosity about the cultures of others.”
107
  In addition they 
base their model on three principles: (1) the principle of mutual respect, which entails a 
certain degree of respect for every culture; (2) the principle of vulnerability, which means 
that patients are in a vulnerable situation requiring great care, especially ones from other 
cultures; and (3) the principle of cultural relevance, which states that ethical conflicts are 
not solved by “the application of rules, principles, and theories of a dominant medical 
culture.”
108
  Instead, the way through conflict, they argue, is by means of the 
conversational process in which both provider and patient engage each other‟s cultural 
and ethical beliefs.  To Carter and Klugman, trust is more fundamental than bioethical 
principles, and their model is an approach that emphasizes learning and understanding 
over problem-solving.   
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While Carter and Klugman‟s approach is culturally sensitive and supplies a 
needed perspective to clinical ethics, they do not intend to supply a decision-making 
framework to resolve moral conflict.  Austin Dacey, in his book The Secular Conscience: 
Why Belief Belongs in Public Life, provides a notion of respect for conscience that lays a 
foundation for a decision-making framework.  He criticizes secular liberalism for similar 
reasons that Macklin criticizes her opponents, but Dacey‟s approach avoids cultural 
insensitivity, while at the same time, providing a guide for proper epistemic functioning.  
Dacey begins by identifying two liberal fallacies: the Privacy and Liberty 
Fallacies:  
The Privacy Fallacy: this fallacy consists in assuming that because matters of 
conscience are private in the sense of nongovernmental, they are private in the 
sense of personal preference. 
 
The Liberty Fallacy: this fallacy begins in the core liberal principle that 
conscience must be left free from coercion. The mistake lies in thinking that 
because conscience is free from coercion, it must be free from criticism, reason, 
truth, or independent, objective standards of right and wrong.
109 
 
These fallacies have influenced the medical profession as well, so when M-requests are 
made that entail only minor medical risk, caregivers comply out of “respect,” citing 
privacy and liberty.  But this is not true respect.   
As Dacey explains, this is just blanket acceptance or disregard.  True respect takes 
matters of conscience seriously, considering others‟ beliefs important and possibly true.  
True respect means holding such beliefs to the standards of the public square: “honesty, 
consistency, rationality, evidential support, feasibility, legality, morality, and 
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 and it is compatible with, even requires, the possibility of disagreement.  
Dacey says, “Understood correctly, respect is not just compatible with criticism – it 
entails criticism.  To respect someone we must take him seriously, and taking someone 
seriously sometimes means finding fault with him.”
111
 
However, this type of critical engagement, or true respect, is rare in the clinic.  
Religious beliefs are often a conversation stopper, and caregivers feel uncomfortable 
asking questions that could be perceived as challenging a patient‟s religious beliefs.  For 
this reason, it is convenient to rationalize the honoring of M-requests as respect for 
patient autonomy, and in our modern patient-centered era, this is widely practiced.  
In pediatrics, this non-engagement of religious beliefs is reinforced in law because 
some states have legal exemptions for religiously motivated medical neglect: “A total of 
32 states provide a defense for felonious child neglect, manslaughter, or murder, where 
the child‟s life was sacrificed for religious reasons, as well as a religious defense for 
misdemeanors arising from physical harm to children resulting from medical neglect.”
112
  
These laws perpetuate the widespread feeling in the clinic, that M-requests are to be, 
always and in every place, honored.  
 Nevertheless, pediatrics supplies another example: medical professionals do 
occasionally intervene and even remove children from parental custody when an M-
request will result in great risk to a child, but this falls short of critical engagement 
because such cases are marked by a lack of consideration of the beliefs themselves – only 
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a consideration of the medical risks.  As such, caregivers operate on the assumption that 
the family‟s beliefs are false or irrelevant and that a secular conception of the no-harm 
principle trumps all competing values.  This is because members of the medical 
community are primarily trained to make decisions as professionals based on the notions 
of medical harm and benefit. 
In short, the status quo fails to adequately respect the religious beliefs of patients.  
Sometimes, caregivers grant M-requests; sometimes, they do not.  But the common 
theme is that religious beliefs are undervalued.  They are undervalued to the extent that 
they are not critically engaged.  One promising solution to this problem is Christopher 




 Meyers proposes rationality criteria for judging whether a surrogate‟s M-request 
should be honored.  His standard is internal consistency (a coherence theory of 
rationality), which he argues for in the following way: (1) on the basis that it is an easily 
accessible standard, that is, physicians can feel confident in applying it; (2) he thinks that 
it is generous and culturally sensitive, reinforcing “commitments to the liberal principles 
of religious tolerance and pluralism;”
113
 and (3) it avoids the “insurmountable problems” 
that plague foundationalist theories of rationality (although he says nothing about what 
these insurmountable problems are).   
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Meyers preferred version of the coherence theory of rationality is called reflective 
equilibrium, and he quotes Beauchamp and Childress (who discuss John Rawls) for an 
explanation: 
The goal of reflective equilibrium is to match, prune, and adjust considered 
judgments in order to render them coherent with the premises of our most general 
moral commitments.  We start with paradigm judgments of moral rightness and 
wrongness, and then construct a more general and more specific account that is 
consistent with these paradigm judgments, rendering them as coherent as possible.  
We then test the resultant action guides to see if they yield incoherent results.  If 




According to this theory, all beliefs are open to revision given tension in the system, even 
religious beliefs.   
Meyers says, “There are no external standards of justification; internal 
consistency is all that is required.”
115
  Under this view, beliefs are not evaluated on 
whether they are factual or conform to certain theological or ethical principles, and there 
need not be any universal conception of human nature.  All that is required is that the 
beliefs not contradict.  He gives an example of a pair of conflicting beliefs: (1) God is 
omnipotent, and (2) God cannot affect human affairs.  Religious beliefs, according to 
Meyers, can be either rational (coherent), irrational (incoherent), or nonrational (when a 
pair of beliefs neither cohere nor contradict).   
 Meyers then appeals to Robert Audi‟s principles to show why religious beliefs 
should be subject to secular standards.  Audi‟s three principles summarized by Meyers 
are: 
1. The Principle of Secular Rationale: If one must constrain the freedom of 
others, one ought to have nonreligious reasons. 
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2. The Principle of Secular Motivation: One‟s nonreligious reasons to constrain 
the freedom of others should be reason enough, so that if the religious reasons 
were eliminated, the choice would still be made. 
 





Meyers thinks that these principles should be applied to surrogate decision making 
because a surrogate decision maker‟s decisions can have a huge impact on the patient – 
much like public policy has an impact on others in Audi‟s example.  Meyers, however, 
modifies Audi‟s principles into a two-part rule to apply to the clinic:  
Part I: When a surrogate‟s choices directly affect a patient‟s length or quality of 
life, decision makers should be sufficiently motivated by secular reasons;  
 
Part II: When religious beliefs are also present, those beliefs must be rational, that 





If an M-request is made that violates either of the two parts of this rule, it should not be 
honored.  
 Meyers‟ shows how this might work in two cases.  In the first, a 65-year-old 
woman with end-stage cancer is ventilator-dependent and fully sedated.  Her oldest son is 
not the only family member, but he is making decisions for her.  He instructs physicians 
to do everything in their power, believing that God will save his mother.  When he learns 
that the pain medication she is on may be interfering with her recovery, he demands that 
it be stopped in spite of being told that it is necessary for her comfort.  He says that the 
pain medication is getting in the way of God‟s desire to heal her.  Using his two-part rule, 
Meyers says that it is not clear whether the son satisfies the first part, but he clearly fails 
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the second (the coherency test).  In the first place, the son believes that a person should 
not be allowed to suffer when there are means available, but he refuses further pain 
medication for his mother.  Second, the son believes that God is omnipotent but also that 
pain medication can frustrate God‟s plans to heal.  Third, he believes, according to his 
religion, that he must honor his parents, but he is dismissive of his mother‟s life plans as 
communicated through other family members.  He is also disrespectful of his father, who 
is present, but not allowed (by the son) to make decisions about his wife‟s care.  Because 
of these inconsistencies, Meyers believes that the son‟s requests should be verbally 
opposed and probably overruled.  
 In the second case, an adult child of two JWs has cerebral palsy and needs surgery 
for a kidney blockage.  The parents inform the hospital staff of the patient‟s firm JW 
beliefs and demand a bloodless surgery.  The hospital seeks to move her to a hospital that 
specializes in bloodless surgeries, but the transfer is unlikely.  The parents take their child 
home to wait for an opening, but this probably means that the child will die.  Meyers 
thinks that this case satisfies the two-part rule.  The first part of the rule is satisfied (the 
secular reason) because there is good evidence that the patient would have made the same 
request if she were able.  The secular principle is a respect for autonomy.  The second 
part of the rule would also be satisfied, Meyers claims, because while the parents want 
their child to survive, they simply desire more to protect her eternal life with God.  There 
are no contradictions in their beliefs or behaviors.  
 Although Meyers‟ two-part rule seems reasonable on the face of it, it suffers from 
a number of problems.  I am aware that Meyers intends his rule only to apply to surrogate 
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decision making, but I am interested in the possibility of its solving the larger problem 
too (M-requests made by surrogates and patients themselves).  First I will examine the 
first part of the rule.  To require surrogates (or patients if we apply the rule more widely) 
to provide secular reasons to accompany an M-request is (1) too burdensome and (2) does 
not take religious beliefs seriously enough.  First, it is too burdensome because average 
religious believers often do not have the level of education or training necessary to speak 
the language of the public square adequately.  Most people, let alone religious believers, 
are only conversant with their own cultures.  What this rule requires is that religious 
believers learn the dominant culture and language of the clinic (for example, bioethical 
principles like autonomy), but why should they shoulder this burden?  At the time the M-
request is made, it is unlikely that a surrogate, assuming the surrogate is closely related to 
the patient, would be able to take a “crash course in secular reason.”  Even if the 
surrogate were not weighed down with other concerns, it is unlikely that enough time 
would be available for the surrogate to learn how to translate her beliefs into a secular 
rationale before the patient expires or the situation changes.  While some religions may 
assist surrogates in this (supplying informational pamphlets to give to doctors), it seems 
unreasonable to expect that every surrogate or religious group be so prepared.  Moreover, 
it seems that society (or the state) should make accommodations for the individual, not 
the other way around.  In Liberty of Conscience, Martha Nussbaum, in describing the 
Accommodation Principle, says that in order to respect matters of conscience, religious 
citizens should be exempt from generally applicable laws.
118
  As mentioned earlier, she 
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quotes from George Washington‟s letter to the Quakers in 1789, which says: “I assure 
you very explicitly, that in my opinion the conscientious scruples of all men should be 
treated with great delicacy and tenderness: and it is my wish and desire, that the laws may 
always be as extensively accommodated to them, as a due regard for the protection and 
essential interests of the nation may justify and permit.”
119
  In Washington‟s example, it 
is the state that makes the accommodation (the sacrifice), while the religious group 
benefits. 
In addition, the surrogacy case is significantly disanalogous to Audi‟s public 
policy scenario because a surrogate is often related to the patient, unlike those in the 
public policy arena whose decisions will constrain the liberty of others unrelated to them.  
To require secular reasons in surrogacy cases is more intrusive because this involves 
intervening in and sometimes breaking the bonds of a family unit.   
 Second, the first part of the rule does not take religious beliefs seriously enough.  
Audi‟s principle of secular motivation requires that the course of action would still be 
chosen if the religious reason dropped out.  I interpret Audi to mean that religious reasons 
do not provide a sufficient justification on which to base public policy decisions, and I 
interpret Meyers‟ rule to mean that religious reasons do not provide a sufficient 
justification on which to base surrogate decision making.  While such a rule may be 
appropriate on the public policy level because the decisions being made constrain the 
liberty of other citizens, it is not appropriate in the clinic where families and patients are 
suffering.  It is at these times that religious beliefs should be given the most 
accommodation, but Meyers‟ rule disallows faith when it matters most.  Taking religious 
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beliefs seriously entails acknowledging that they might be sufficient justification for 
actions, even actions that affect others.  Of course, there are limits to the type of actions 
that can be justified this way, but it is far from clear that surrogate decision making is one 
of those limits, especially when the surrogate is acting on the perceived best interests of 
the patient.    
 The second part of Meyers‟ rule, the coherency requirement, suffers from a 
couple of problems.  First, it may be necessary, but it is not sufficient as a criterion to 
limit M-requests.  As Meyers writes, “Internal consistency is surely the least one can 
expect of decision makers when their choices potentially harm others.”
120
  While this is 
true, certainly much more should be expected; for example, the choices should be 
compassionate, courageous, and just.  Consider Meyers‟ first case.  The problem with the 
elder son is not just that he holds inconsistent theological and ethical beliefs and that his 
actions do not match up with his stated beliefs; the problem is that the son seems to have 
a control issue.  He oversteps his father‟s authority and ignores the points of view of 
everyone else in the family, including his mother‟s.  He also lacks compassion: he seems 
to care little for his mother‟s suffering, only caring that God‟s power be demonstrated in 
her survival.  His theological beliefs are not only inconsistent, but also they are probably 
aberrant, meaning they depart greatly from the teachings of his religious community.  
Such a conflict could be resolved by putting the son in conversation with someone from 
his church or someone who represents his religion such as a chaplain.  The son‟s 
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treatment requests should not be honored, not for the reasons that Meyers‟ gives, but 
because his requests are callous and cavalier.   
 Meyers grants his blessing on the M-request in the second case (The JW case) 
because it can be shown that the parents‟ theological and ethical beliefs are coherent.  
However, just because a surrogate‟s beliefs are coherent does not mean that they should 
be honored.  The beliefs of the parents of the followers of Jim Jones (of the Jonestown 
tragedy) may be shown to be coherent, but that hardly means that their beliefs and 
choices should be tolerated.  Instead, it is more likely that the epistemic practices of the 
Jonestown community were deeply deficient, for example, instead of being open to the 
views of others outside the community, the people insulated themselves from the outside 
(which is the reason the People‟s Temple moved from California to Guyana).  They 
cultivated epistemic vices, not virtues.  And it is for this reason we can refuse to tolerate 
the choices that followed.  The JW case is much the same.  JW parents may forfeit their 
surrogacy rights if their beliefs are not formed in a reasonable way, and while consistency 
is an important aspect of reasonableness, it is not the only one.  
 If we apply the coherency requirement to the African Female Circumcision case, 
we encounter a similar problem.  The practice of female circumcision does not seem to 
contradict the beliefs of the parents or communities that practice it.  In fact, it appears that 
the belief coheres well with their religious beliefs.  On their view, it is mandated by God 
(Islam, Christianity, and others have been used to defend the practice).  It also coheres 
well with their belief that female hyper-sexuality is a bad thing.  To supporters, what 
better way to control female sexuality but through a clitoridectomy?  It also coheres well 
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with the traditional view that a virgin bride is a good thing, so parents should “protect” 
their daughters by sewing them up.  It appears that the coherency requirement would 
condone such a practice, but to many, this is deeply troubling.  Female circumcision 
dehumanizes women.  It seems to represent, as Dr. Jordan believes (in the earlier case) an 
“unacceptable disfigurement, repression, and control of women.”  But if this is the 
appropriate conclusion, Meyers‟ rule will not deliver the goods.  
  An additional worry with the coherency requirement is that all religions have 
coherency “problems” (so do scientific theories such as the wave-particle duality theory 
of light).  In other words, there are apparent contradictions in even the most well-
established religions, and since this is the case, it is not clear that any religion would pass 
Meyers‟ test.  To provide a couple of examples: Christianity teaches that God does not 
want anyone to go to hell (2 Peter 3:9) but also that God is omnipotent, so he could save 
everyone if he wanted (but apparently does not).  Buddhism teaches the doctrine of 
reincarnation but also the doctrine of anatta (no self).  If there is no self, then what is 
reincarnated?  For centuries, religious scholars in both traditions have wrestled with these 
problems and suggested various solutions, but it is unlikely that these problems will be 
solved anytime soon.   
A possible rejoinder is that many so-called “contradictions” are not contradictions 
at all, but only “paradoxes,” the difference being that paradoxes are merely apparent 
contradictions.  Religious scholars from both the east and west have argued that religion 
often seems contradictory on the surface only because of the inadequacy of human 
language to capture the ultimate mystery.  Even if this rejoinder is correct, it is not clear 
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that Meyers‟ rule can benefit practically from this distinction, for who is to decide which 
“contradictions” are only apparent?  Meyers, having abandoned externalist and 
foundationalist principles, does not have the tools to accomplish such a task, and from 
within a believer‟s worldview all “contradictions” are only apparent. 
 In addition, there are a number of problems with Meyers‟ analysis of his first 
case.  The elder son cannot only use this confusion over apparent contradictions to his 
advantage, he might also provide a sophisticated defense of his beliefs and choices.  For 
example, he can claim that while God is omnipotent and could heal his mother in spite of 
the pain medication, God chooses not to because he desires human obedience, which, in 
this case, may include God‟s prohibition of any treatment that might shorten life (under 
this view, God would not be a fan of double effect).  Moreover, it is possible (at least 
Meyers does not rule this out) that the family comes from a traditional culture in which 
elder sons are expected to be the “spiritual heads” of families and make hard decisions 
even if others in the family disagree with them.  If so, then what appears to be 
contradictory beliefs on the part of the elder son can be understood as coherent. 
 
Conclusion 
 Internal consistency is not alone sufficient grounds upon which to decide whether 
to honor an M-request, and to require that a surrogate be sufficiently motivated by secular 
reasons fails to take religious beliefs seriously enough.  Instead, we should (1) allow 
surrogates to act on religious motivations, (2) require a reasonable amount of internal 
consistency, and (3) determine whether such a request is compatible with moral and 
epistemic norms.  The third point is probably too “foundationalistic” for Meyers, but if 
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there is any hope in holding surrogate M-requests to a high standard, then we may have 
to employ a “foundationalistic” normative theory.   
 Macklin‟s approach is helpful insofar as it rules out ethical relativism, but it also 
fails to take religious beliefs seriously enough.  Carter and Klugman‟s approach is 
instructive and essential for clinical training in patient care and ethics consultations, but it 
does not offer a decision-making procedure.  
 What we need is an approach that takes religious beliefs seriously, giving more 
than lip service to respecting matters of conscience.  However, we also need an approach 






























      A phronesis-based approach is culturally sensitive and can, at the same time, hold 
religious beliefs to a high moral standard.  In this chapter, I develop such an approach 
using Linda Zagzebski‟s Principle of Rational Belief and analyzing the intellectual 
virtues.  I also provide a set of conditions that caregivers will find useful in clinical case 
evaluations.  
 
The Principle of Rational Belief 
Linda Zagzebski suggests a principle for evaluating religious beliefs: The 
Principle of Rational Belief (PRB), which evaluates beliefs in reference to the phronimos, 
the person of practical wisdom.  Zagzebski defines PRB as follows: 
The Principle of Rational Belief: S‟s belief p in culture C is rational just in case a 
person with phronesis outside culture C might believe p if she were in S‟s 




This principle is in the form of a subjunctive, and it works by asking the question of 
specific beliefs: if a rational person were in S‟s shoes, is it possible that the rational 
person would believe S‟s belief p?  Notice some important aspects of the principle: first, 
the holder of the belief (S) need not be fully rational (or virtuous) herself.  This would 
make the principle too strict since most people fall short of full virtue.  Second, the 
person with phronesis need not be real; she may merely be an abstract idea.  Second, 
outside culture C need not mean a member of culture D; again, the virtuous person may 
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be a conceptual construct.  Finally, the principle says that a person with phronesis might 
believe p, not that she would.  This makes the principle much weaker, meaning that it is 
enough that the belief does not violate epistemic virtues. 
Consider the case of a prehistoric man called Cave Man, a Neanderthal who 
walked the earth forty thousand years ago (suspend your doubts about whether 
Neanderthals had sufficiently developed cognitive capacities to be virtuous).  Cave Man 
most certainly would have believed that the earth was flat.  PRB would classify this belief 
as rational if and only if a virtuous person could have arrived at the same belief in the 
circumstances.  Considering the state of scientific knowledge at the time, it is implausible 
to think that a virtuous person would not have believed the earth was flat.  A belief in a 
flat earth is compatible with simple perception, and in the ancient context, it does not 
violate any epistemic norms even if the belief turns out to be false.    
Zagzebski grounds PRB on a theory of moral exemplarism, which is a moral 
theory in which moral exemplars play a central role.  She describes the framework of 
such a theory: “[It] defines the evaluative properties of persons, acts, and the outcomes of 
acts by reference to the exemplar or exemplars identified by the theory.  Good and bad 
traits of character are defined in terms of the traits of character of the exemplar.  The 
moral properties of acts are defined in terms of the actual or hypothetical acts of the 
exemplar.  Good and bad outcomes are defined in terms of the states of affairs the 
exemplar aims to bring about or to prevent.”
122
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The first step in a theory of exemplarism is to identify the exemplar, and this can 
be done (and is commonly done) prior to any conceptual analysis of the good.
123
  
Zagzebski says, “The phronimos [moral exemplar or person of practical wisdom] can be 
defined, roughly, as a person like that, where we make a demonstrative reference to a 
paradigmatically good person.”
124
  She appeals to Saul Kripke‟s work on natural kinds, 
saying that picking out a moral exemplar is like picking out water.  We can pick out 
something in advance, prior to understanding its nature.  In the case of water we say, 
“This is water,” and only later learn that water is necessarily H2O.  In the same way, we 
pick out moral exemplars in the community and only later learn by analysis what 
character traits they exemplify.  Picking out moral exemplars is logically prior to being 
able to explain why they are moral exemplars; Zagzebski says, “I surmise that the move 
from “I want to be like R and not like S” to “R is better than S” is not only genetically 
primitive, but also basic to moral thinking.”
125
   
She explains that exemplarism, or what she calls an ethics of imitation, fits 
naturally with what we know about human psychology.  Human behavior, she describes, 
is acquired through imitation.  From the very earliest stages of development, we imitate 
the behavior of others – not only overt behavior, but also attitudes and emotions.  In 
short, we imitate other people.  She says, “The psychology of moral learning suggests 
that person exemplars are more basic than act exemplars, because the former are imitated 
in more ways than their behavior.  Since imitating other persons includes imitating both 
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their behavior and their emotions, we have a simpler model for understanding human 
imitation if we think of the primary objects of imitation as being other persons.”
126
 
Zagzebski‟s theory is influenced by Aristotle, who says that the moral mean is “as 
a man of practical wisdom would determine it.”
127
  In Aristotelian ethics, the phronimos 
is the archetype of morality.  Aristotle says that a phronimos is the model of right action 
and right emotions and feels emotions “at the right times, with reference to the right 
objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way.”
128
  A 
phronimos exemplifies the virtues of the good life such as courage, honesty and 
compassion, living a well-balanced life, avoiding the extremes of both “too much” and 
“too little.”     
There are a couple of common objections to exemplarism.  First, one objection is 
that the exemplars we pick out in the world around us often disagree with one another.  
However, this problem can be resolved.  Zagzebski explains:  
Exemplars change, particularly under the influence of other exemplars, but there 
would be no reason for them to change if they were perfect.  Furthermore, an 
exemplar does not have to be perfectly virtuous in order to function satisfactorily 
to fix the reference of „good.‟  It is not necessary that our exemplars of water be 




These real life exemplars allow us to fix our reference, but it is the later realization that 
some exemplars have better or more traits than others that drives us to imagine what a 
fully virtuous moral exemplar would look like.  The limitations of moral exemplars 
simply drive us to look beyond and imagine a being like them, but more virtuous.   
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The second objection is related to the first.  Some think that exemplarism suffers 
from a circularity problem: being able to pick out a good person assumes a conception of 
the good.  Zagzebski‟s response to this is to say that the circularity objection applies only 
if moral concepts are basic.  Zagzebski writes: 
We cannot define everything in a fixed domain using conceptual analysis.  Unless 
we are willing to accept conceptual circularity, either some moral concept or 
concepts will be basic, or the foundation of the theory will refer to something 
outside the domain.  That means that either something is good in the most basic 
way and we cannot expect a defense for its goodness, or the structure of moral 
theory rests on something (allegedly) outside of ethics…But if reference to 
exemplars of good persons can be incorporated into the foundation of a theory 
without going through concepts, then that would permit us to avoid the problems 
with a purely conceptual foundation.  We have a model for constructing a theory 
of this kind in the theory of direct reference.”
130
   
 
Exemplarism begins with “goodness” in a basic way, by direct reference not concepts, so 
it seems impervious to the circularity charge. 
 Starting with “goodness” in this way might allow us to identify other concepts by 
direct reference too, such as a good life.  Zagzebski writes: “I have proposed that „good‟ 
is defined by direct reference.  If so, it is plausible that „good life‟ is defined by direct 
reference as well.  It is a life like that, which is to say that we know it when we see it.  It 
is a life we want to imitate.”
131
  In this way, we may also be able to identify concepts like 
good belief or good religion.  
 Some might still respond that Zagzebski‟s reply to the circularity charge is 
unsatisfactory because it fails to screen out “exemplars” like Ted Bundy and Adolf Hitler.  
Someone might mistakenly pick out bad exemplars, thinking they are good, and a moral 
theory ought to prevent such errors.  So, a better answer to the circularity charge is to 
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base a theory of moral exemplarism on the moral virtues.  Under such an approach, a 
moral exemplar is one who exemplifies the moral virtues, and the moral virtues are 
widely known.  
If there is some confusion about or disagreement among moral exemplars, an 
analysis or examination of the virtues is required.  Rosalind Hursthouse help us 
understand how we might apply PRB in practice: “If I acknowledge that I am far from 
perfect, and am quite unclear what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances…the 
obvious thing to do is to go and ask one, should this be possible.”
132
 If this is not 
possible, she says, the virtues of a virtuous person are known (e.g. open-mindedness, 
conscientiousness, intellectual courage etc.), so determining what a rational person might 
believe in the circumstances simply requires hypothetical reasoning once the 
circumstances are understood.  For example, one might ask what an open-minded person 
might believe if she were in S‟s circumstances.  Open-minded people consider other 
points of view, remain tentative when appropriate, and avoid a head-in-the-sand attitude.  
Is it possible that a person with such behaviors and attitudes might come to believe S‟s 
belief p if she were in S‟s place?   
Austin Dacey describes the norms of reason that a rational person would follow: 
“honesty, consistency, rationality, evidential support, feasibility, legality, morality, and 
revisability.”  Dacey unpacks these norms in the following way: 
Honesty means we typically say what we really think; rationality, that we take 
efficient means to our ends (at least); consistency, that we are prepared to accept 
the implications of our views as they apply in other instances; evidence, that it 
matters how our reasons link up with the real world (or don‟t); feasibility, that the 
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proposal is realistic; legality and morality, that it is in accord with our laws and 





These norms of reason are illuminating, but I think they are better conceived of as virtues 
(virtues of the mind), as constituents of a philosophical framework that stretches back to 
Aristotle‟s virtue ethics.
134
  Reframing these norms in this way would provide the norms 
with a solid foundation and provide many conceptual resources.  In addition, this makes it 
possible to provide a unifying principle, which should make the standards more 
accessible to caregivers.  I provide an analysis of intellectual virtues below. 
Some people might object that the virtues are culturally relative, so employing 
PRB would be impossible because what a virtue is in one culture might not be the same 
in another.  Take for example “open-mindedness.”  In many religious communities, it 
seems that open-mindedness is a vice and dogmatic adherence to doctrine (or 
faithfulness) is a virtue.  This problem is deep and troubling, but not impossible.  First, it 
is important to note that this is not a difficulty unique to this principle; every ethical 
theory must attempt to handle the divergences in moral judgments across people and 
cultures.  Second, some virtues are essential to the proper functioning and survival of 
society – honesty, for example.  James Rachels argues that truth-telling is essential to any 
complex society.  If a society does not value honesty, then there would be no reason to 
trust what anyone says; communication and social functioning would break down.
135
  
Similar arguments can be made for the virtues of fidelity and reverence for life.  Third, 
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rationality is an attribute of humanity, not a concept that is restricted to localized 
traditions.  If it were the case that the concept of rationality had no objective sense to it, 
then it is questionable whether we could discover anything objective in the world – 
whether we could ever escape our own particular “language games.”  In arguing for the 
transcendence of rationality, Zagzebski says,  
Whatever rationality is, it is something all humans share… What is rational is in 
principle recognizably rational by all rational beings, which means all humans, 
even those outside one‟s cultural community. To be rational is to be able to talk to 
other persons and to make oneself understood, no matter who those persons are. 
This is the sense in which rationality is transcendent. It is what permits us to 
communicate with one another and to form a human community that transcends 
the individual communities we inhabit.
136
   
 
Rationality is an attribute that is deeply connected to our being human – a defining 
characteristic
38
 even if we fail to be fully rational.  Therefore, even if background beliefs 
vary from time and place, moral and intellectual virtues do not.   
 Another difficulty involves defining a culture for the purposes of employing the 
Principle.  Is a culture to be thought of as a large community such as North America or 
might it be defined more narrowly such as a group of JWs in North America?  I think the 
concept of culture is flexible here.  Adopting a broader definition of culture would 
complicate PRB because of the sheer number of background beliefs that would need to be 
considered; nevertheless, the number of virtues remain the same whether the culture is 
small or large.  In some cases, choosing the size of the culture could affect the outcome 
of the PRB procedure.  For example, if the culture is limited to the Yearning For Zion 
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 then the impoverishment of background beliefs of that community 
would most certainly affect what a virtuous person would believe.  However, if it is 
doubtful that a phronimos would ever lock herself up in such a compound, then it is hard 
to see how any of the beliefs of the members of that community could ever qualify as 
rational.  Depending on the case, it might be important to employ multiple (broader) 
conceptions of a patient‟s culture before reaching a conclusion.  
PRB is compatible with what Zagzebski calls The Culture Sensitivity Principle, 
which is one of three principles of rationality she says constrain how diversity should be 
treated:  
The Culture Sensitivity Principle: Persons should treat the members of other 





The principle constitutes a check against the tendency to conclude that cultural beliefs 
that are different from one‟s own are, on the basis of that fact alone, irrational.  
Nevertheless, the Culture Sensitivity Principle does not rule out a determination that 
beliefs in other cultures are irrational; in other words, it is possible to be discriminating 
and remain culturally sensitive.  What matters is the procedure one uses to arrive at such 
a judgment.  
In addition, PRB is culturally sensitive because it defines rationality in terms of 
process, not content.  Defining rationality in terms of process means to say that it is the 
procedure that matters, not the end result.  In other words, whatever beliefs are acquired 
through a rational process are to that extent rational; there is no set of universally-
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recognized irrational beliefs, the believing of which, apart from any investigation, 
automatically disqualifies the believer.  For example, to the extent to which a belief in 
reincarnation is the result of an act of intellectual virtue, it is to that extent rational.  Also, 
to the extent to which a belief in the possibility of miracles is the result of an act of 
intellectual virtue, it is to that extent rational.  The alternative – defining rationality in 
terms of the content of the belief – is dangerous because of the tendency to impose on 
others, as the standard of rationality, the particular beliefs of the dominant culture.  For 
example, a westerner is not likely to believe in the power of deceased ancestors to affect 
the lives of the living, and she will likely dismiss Chinese ancestral worship as irrational.  
But this is just a form of cultural imperialism, one that we might call cultural epistemic 
imperialism.  PRB naturally recognizes that phronimoi arrive at beliefs via acts of 
intellectual virtue and that possibly there are phronimoi in every culture, so it is 
ineffective and insensitive to make a list of particular irrational beliefs without first 
considering whether the beliefs might be acquired through an act of intellectual virtue in 
a different culture.  
 
Intellectual Virtues 
 Zagzebski defines intellectual virtue as follows: “a deep and enduring acquired 
excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired 
end and reliable success in bringing about that end.”
139
  The list of intellectual virtues 
includes intellectual courage, caution, and open-mindedness – traits that are widely 
desired and recognized as being successful in acquiring truth. 
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Zagzebski distinguishes between a virtue and an act of virtue.  Her definition of 
an act of intellectual virtue is as follows: “An act of intellectual virtue A is an act that 
arises from the motivational component of A, is something a person with virtue A would 
(probably) do in the circumstances, is successful in achieving the end of the A 
motivation, and is such that the agent acquires a true belief (cognitive contact with 
reality) through these features of the act.”
140
  According to this definition, an act of 
intellectual virtue has three components: a motivational, procedural and success 
component.  For example, an act of open-mindedness will have truth acquisition as a 
motivation, will follow typical procedures (such as listening to the views of others), and 
will result in the acquisition of a true belief.  Distinguishing between a virtue and an act 
of virtue allows for the possibility that a person‟s actions might be appraised as virtuous 
without the person herself having a fully virtuous character.  
Zagzebski‟s “success component” of the definition of an intellectual virtue is 
problematic, and it is ad hoc insofar as it is primarily meant to solve Gettier problems, 
even though she claims otherwise.  In Part III of Virtues of the Mind, Linda Zagzebski 
offers a definition of knowledge that she claims is immune to Gettier problems: 
“Knowledge is a state of cognitive contact with reality arising from acts of intellectual 
virtue.”
141
  She claims that this definition is better than rival analyses of knowledge 
because it defines knowledge in a way that is not ad hoc.  For example, she notes that one 
way to answer Gettier cases and save the traditional analysis of knowledge is by defining 
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knowledge as “nonaccidentally true belief.”
142
  However, she argues that this definition 
of knowledge falls short because the definition “nonaccidentally true belief” is something 
only a philosopher would have thought of who was familiar with Gettier cases.  She says, 
“a good definition should be formulated in such a way that it does not contain features 
whose sole advantage is to answer counterexamples.”
143
  She says, “What I tried to do 
with the concept of an act of intellectual virtue was to propose a concept of a kind of act 
that gets everything right.  It is general enough that it applies to overt acts, not just 
cognitive acts, and it is a concept we would want anyway, even if nobody had ever 
thought of [Gettier] cases.”
144
  Every definition of knowledge that is formulated as true 
belief plus something (where the “something” does not entail truth) is vulnerable to 
Gettier problems.
145
  Zagzebski‟s success component attempts to close the gap between 
true belief and knowledge, and her definition of knowledge – cognitive contact with 
reality arising from acts of intellectual virtue – avoids Gettier problems, she claims, 
because unlike other “true belief plus something” formulae, it does not leave room for 
error.   
However, while her definition of knowledge seems to have clear advantages, I am 
not sure it is entirely successful, for it depends on the success component, which seems 
dubious.  An act of intellectual virtue of, say, open-mindedness is still an act of virtue 
even if it does not succeed in reaching its aim, the truth.  Ought we to criticize someone 
who acts as conscientiously as a fully virtuous agent would, but fails to get the truth?  We 
                                                 
142
 Traditional analysis of knowledge: Knowledge = justified true belief 
143
 Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, 265. 
144
 Linda Zagzebski, from a personal e-mail, February 4, 2004. 
145
 As Zagzebski cogently argues in the following: Linda Zagzebski, “The Inescapability of Gettier 
Problems.” The Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174): 65. 
67 
 
can imagine a situation (one that is fairly common) where the acquisition of knowledge is 
simply too difficult even for someone who acts thus – the circumstances conspire against 
our conscientious agent and she simply fails to acquire knowledge.  Nevertheless, we 
would still praise her actions as virtuous.   
 Zagzebski recognizes this concern, acknowledging that our agent‟s actions would 
be praiseworthy but simply not fully virtuous.  She writes,  
Even when an act is motivated properly and is what a virtuous person would 
characteristically do in the circumstances, it may fail in the aim of the act.  When 
this happens the act lacks something morally desirable [namely moral luck] … for 
example, a person might be motivated by generosity and act in a way 
characteristic of generous persons in some particular circumstance[s], say by 
giving money to a beggar on the street, but if it turns out that the beggar is really 
rich and is playing the part of a beggar to win a bet, we would think that there is 
something morally lacking in the act…her act would not merit the degree of 
praise due it if the beggar were really deserving.  The same point applies to 
intellectual acts.  A person may be motivated by intellectual virtues and act in a 
way intellectually virtuous persons characteristically act in attempting to get 
knowledge, but if she fails to get the truth, her epistemic state is lacking 





I think Zagzebski is partly wrong here.  Although it is clear that luck has a part to 
play, this need not take away from the praiseworthiness of the agent‟s act.  It is 
unfortunate that our agent‟s hard work does not pay off, but this is simply unfortunate, 
not something lacking on the agent‟s part.
147
  The virtuousness of the act is independent 
of the act‟s outcome.  Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood agree: “From the fact that I 
performed an act of generosity, it does not follow that I actually helped anybody…The 
same is true of intellectual virtues.  A person can perform acts of open-mindedness, of 
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diligence in investigations, of charity in his interpretations of others‟ views, of honesty 
with himself and with others, and still not hit on the truth.”
148
   
Roberts and Wood also suggest that her definition is ad hoc.  They think that it is 
artificially tailored to avoid Gettier problems because “the infallibility of acts of virtue 
presupposed by her definition of knowledge is not a noticeable part of [the history of 
philosophy], or of ordinary people‟s use of „virtue‟; her particular twist on the concept of 




Thus, I propose that Zagzebski abandon the success component of her definition 
of an act of virtue.  Her definition of knowledge would still be formulated as “cognitive 
contact with reality arising from acts of intellectual virtue (but where acts of virtue do not 
guarantee truth).”  However, if the success component is dropped, then she loses the 
ability to answer Gettier problems, which may not be so bad anyways.  At most, this 
would put her theory on par with the many others, but would not necessarily undermine 
it.  Zagzebski‟s definition of knowledge has other strengths that rival theories lack, for 
example relating the traits of an agent‟s character to the acquisition of knowledge, and 
that is commendable.  
In Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology, Roberts and Wood 
present a guide for epistemic practice, steering epistemology away from the standard 
debates, such as the definition of knowledge – debates which they think have ended in 
                                                 
148
 Roberts C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 13. 
149





  Regulative epistemology, as they call it, is more fruitful than the standard 
analytic type.  Regulative epistemology “is a response to perceived deficiencies in 
people‟s epistemic conduct, and thus is strongly practical and social, rather than just an 
interesting theoretical challenge for philosophy professors and smart students.  This kind 
of epistemology aims to change the (social) world.”
151
  Roberts and Wood follow in the 
footsteps of John Locke, who in his Of the Conduct of the Understanding describes the 
personal dispositions and habits of mind of a rational person.  This Lockean kind of 
virtue analysis is the role that Roberts and Wood take on in Part II of their book, 
describing in detail a series of intellectual virtues: love of knowledge, firmness, courage 
and caution, humility, autonomy, generosity, and practical wisdom.  In the pages that 
follow, I will explore and expand on their analysis of these virtues because I think such 
an examination is necessary in order to apply the Principle of Rational Belief effectively. 
 
The Love of Knowledge 
First, the love of knowledge is a virtue that is based on the innate human desire to 
know.  Children come into the world with this desire, but it must mature and grow, 
becoming a refined, excellent character trait.  For one, it is not enough to have an 
indiscriminate love of knowledge; some kinds of knowledge are more valuable than other 
kinds.  For example, one could memorize random facts in a phone book, or one could set 
about the more admirable task of learning the properties of the HIV virus in order to find 
a cure.  Roberts and Wood explain that some cases of knowledge are more worthy than 
others in virtue of their connection to human flourishing (the extent to which they 
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advance human well-being) and that some objects of knowledge have intrinsic 
importance.  Also, some cases of knowledge bear a greater epistemic weight than others 
by supporting other beliefs.  Moreover, some knowledge may not be as important to one 
agent as it is to another.  For example, the knowledge of how to feed my family is more 
relevant to me than it is to you.
152
   
Roberts and Wood explain that the love of knowledge should translate to the 
purveyance of knowledge because knowledge is a social affair.  People who love 
knowledge are motivated to see others love knowledge and acquire it.
153
  Roberts and 
Wood say, “Here the love of knowledge is not just a love of epistemic goods as such, but 
of other people‟s having them.  So what we would ordinarily call a moral motivation is 
involved in the structure of the virtue…but the virtue is intellectual inasmuch as the good 
or the justice that is wished for the other is an epistemic one.”
154
  The love of knowledge 
in this sense might be called intellectual generosity. 
Roberts and Wood describe a number of ways that people can fall short of the 
love of knowledge.  First, they might fail to have a concern for knowledge, otherwise 
known as epistemic complacency.
155
  Consider the following examples: they may decline 
opportunities to test their beliefs; they may become discouraged with the amount of effort 
that is required to acquire knowledge; they may shield themselves from hurtful self-
knowledge; and academically, they may avoid anomalies that could disconfirm their 
theories (as in science).  The solution for this kind of complacency is an education that 
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treats the truth as an intrinsic good, not just a good useful for passing a course or 
protecting a religious dogma.  
Second, they might have an unvirtuous concern for knowledge.  For example, 
desiring knowledge solely for instrumental reasons can be unvirtuous (but not always).  
Roberts and Wood explain: “If a piece of knowledge merits a Nobel prize, one who 
desires that knowledge only for the Prize has a defective epistemic will.”
156
  An example 
in which instrumental knowledge could be virtuous is in the case of biological knowledge 
being used instrumentally for its medical applications.  Gossip is another example of a 
kind of knowledge that only unvirtuous people are concerned with.  Even if the gossip is 
not found to be harmful to someone else, it is by its nature a violation of privacy.  Roberts 
and Wood say, “The gossiper exhibits a deficit of circumspection, of seriousness about 
the question: Is this something I, in my circumstances, am permitted to learn, or to pass 
on to this other in his circumstances?”
157
  
Third, they might fail to have a concern not to know.  A gossiper is a 
straightforward example of this, as seen above; a gossiper fails in this concern.  However, 
we can also see examples of this with cases of higher-order knowledge.  For example, a 
scientist may have the desire to unlock the mysteries of human cloning and may be on the 
verge of doing so, but she may realize that she herself and modern society would not be 
able to handle such knowledge.
158
  She would be faced with the question of whether the 
good of the potential knowledge would be outweighed by the potential for evil.  This is a 
difficult question, one that would be best answered by a phronimos.  Assuming that the 
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scientist is right about the fact that this knowledge would not be handled correctly, it 
seems the appropriate concern to have here would be the concern not to acquire the 
cloning knowledge.  
 
Firmness 
It is natural and right to hold firmly to beliefs; in fact, having beliefs at all implies 
a certain amount of firmness about something.  If I believe that I see a big truck coming 
at me, I am committed, in some sense, to the truth of that belief.  If I believe that eating 
fast food every day is unhealthy, then I am committed to the falsehood of the proposition 
that eating it every day is healthy.  It would be impossible to believe anything if a certain 
amount of firmness were not an essential part of belief.  Thomas Kuhn discusses firmness 
in science, that scientists are justified in holding onto a theory even in the presence of 
anomalies.
159
  In fact, a scientist who worries about every anomaly cannot do good 
science.  Kuhn says, “The scientist who pauses to examine every anomaly he notes will 
seldom get significant work done.”
160
   
Roberts and Wood describe firmness as an Aristotelian virtue, as a mean between 
two extremes.   It is not necessarily the midpoint between holding beliefs too loosely or 
tightly; there are probably a range of possibilities in the middle depending on the 
circumstances.
161
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People who do not hold beliefs firmly are thought to be intellectually flabby.
162
  
An example of this kind of flabbiness is someone who believes whatever is popular at the 
moment among her peers.  This flabby person changes her mind whenever her peers do, 
not on the basis of good evidence, but simply because the beliefs she held before are no 
longer popular.  Skeptics are also in violation of the virtue of firmness.  Skeptics are 
worried about being too rigid and about the negative consequences of being mistaken, so 
they withhold their belief.  Roberts and Wood explain: “The skeptic aims to be 
invulnerable by virtue of flexing with the storm vicissitudes, by going with the flow and 
riding the waves, like seaweed or fish.  So the perfect graduate of skeptical therapy just 
goes with the flow of his desires as they arise in response to the impressions that he 
receives from his environment.”
163
   
Nevertheless, hyper-firmness is also a danger.  Roberts and Wood call this 
“rigidity” or being “too stiff.”  They describe five kinds of rigidity.
164
  First, there is 
dogmatism, which is “a disposition to respond irrationally to oppositions to the belief: 
anomalies, objections, evidence to the contrary, counterexamples, and the like.”
165
  This 
irrationality manifests in an unwillingness to listen to other opinions or consider 
counterarguments.  Second, there is doxastic complacency, which is a laziness that 
manifests in a determination to stick with one‟s beliefs because doing otherwise would 
require too much work or research.  Third, there is stolid perseverance, which is an 
overly-tenacious holding onto an epistemic goal when it would be more reasonable to 
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give it up or modify it.  Fourth, there is perceptual rigidity, which is the condition that 
arises when an individual is so committed to her beliefs that she cannot even recognize 
things that would count against them.  Finally, there is comprehensional rigidity, which is 
the inability to understand conceptual frameworks other than one‟s own.  
 
Courage and Caution 
The virtues of courage and caution are complementary, related as they are to fear.  
Roberts and Wood explain: “Both virtues are dispositions with respect to fear, though 
they are differently related to it.  If courage is a disposition to mitigate, circumvent, or 
transcend fears, caution is a disposition to cultivate, refine, and listen to one‟s fears.”
166
  
Caution might be called “appropriate fear” in that it considers real problems that might 
threaten one‟s epistemic situation.  Courage refers to the strength needed to protect or 
improve one‟s situation.  In some cases, caution will be called for, in others, courage. 
Courage is both a moral and epistemic virtue, but as the latter it is related to the 
love of knowledge.  Intellectual cowardice is an inadequate love of knowledge.  
Knowledge acquisition can often be painful.  It might require opening one‟s most 
cherished beliefs to criticism, and it might result in a difficult transformation of one‟s 
identity.  Roberts and Wood show how cowardice can manifest in academic departments.  
For one, a department might choose not to hire an applicant whose research or 
intelligence might threaten to upend the prized research or intelligence of others in the 
department.  In such a case, pride or fear is given preference over the love of knowledge.  
Academicians may give in to fear in other ways too; consider the following example: “A 
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philosopher so scrupulous about protecting himself against refutation that he convolutes 
his formulas with multiple and involved qualifications that render his written and spoken 
discourse a monstrosity of vacuous and incomprehensible ass-covering.”
167
 
A person of courage is also a person of caution when appropriate.  To lack caution 
is to be reckless.  A reckless love of knowledge is one in which knowledge is pursued 
relentlessly without concern for the consequences on other individuals, communities, or 
societies.  Roberts and Wood explore this phenomenon in the context of Shakespeare‟s 
Othello.
168
  Literary critics have speculated as to the motivation Iago might have in 
arousing Othello‟s jealousy toward Desdemona.  One critic has suggested that Iago may 
be motivated simply by a desire to know how Othello would react under certain 
conditions and stresses.  Hence, this critic suggests that since knowledge acquisition is 
good for its own sake, Iago‟s actions are morally acceptable.  Nevertheless, the case of 
Othello shows that knowledge acquisition can be destructive (destroying both Othello 
and Desdemona), so it should be pursued with caution.   
On the other hand, while caution is good, one can be overly cautious.  Roberts and 
Woods call this “scrupulosity.”
169
  This vice is present when an individual is afraid of 
taking risks; she is unable to judge when taking risks are appropriate.  Roberts and Wood 
think that W. K. Clifford‟s “The Ethics of Belief” essay is an example of scrupulosity.
170
  
In it, Clifford argues that it is wrong to ever believe something on insufficient evidence 
lest, as in his ship-owner thought experiment, horrible things happen.  Clifford‟s ship-
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owner may not have been cautious enough, but Clifford thinks that even drunk drivel in a 
village alehouse should be held to this high standard lest society “shrinks back into 
savagery.”
171
  Roberts and Wood argue that Clifford‟s high demands are unrealistic.  
Such a high degree of certainty is impossible and not even desirable.  They say, “The 
person who is virtuously cautious…knows that the ship must eventually sail, and that 
Cartesian certainty is not available in the case.  He knows that religious beliefs are not 
susceptible to the same kind of testing as a ship‟s seaworthiness, and that if one is to reap 
the benefits of religious life one must (with courage) venture out with faith.”
172
 
 Faith requires courage, and religious believers often exemplify such a virtue.  
However, the most common concern is that believers are not cautious enough (hence, 
lacking true courage), believing indiscriminately whatever their particular religion 
teaches.  The victims of the Jonestown tragedy might have escaped their fate if they 
would have showed a little more caution and skepticism about the character of Jim Jones.  
A properly cautious or courageous religious believer will know when faith is appropriate 
and when it is better to withhold belief.  This virtue is closely connected with the virtue 
of autonomy, which I will explore below.  
 
Humility 
 Intellectual humility is the disposition to evaluate one‟s intelligence or intellectual 
accomplishments properly.  It might seem that humility means to have a low estimation 
of oneself, but such a definition would make it impossible for unusually intelligent 
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individuals to be virtuous.  Instead, the virtue of humility is better located between the 
vices of having too high and too low an evaluation of oneself.  It is to have in mind one‟s 
human and limited epistemic condition, but also to realize one‟s intellectual 
accomplishments.   
 Roberts and Wood show how the virtue of intellectual humility is contrasted with 
the vices of vanity and arrogance.
173
  They describe the intellectually vain person as one 
who is too concerned with impressing others or looking smart.  They say, “The lack of 
concern to look good frees the intellectually humble person to pursue intellectual goods 
simply and undistractedly…the humble person will be free to test his ideas against the 
strongest objections.  His humility may also make for intellectual adventure: he will not 
be afraid to try out ideas that others may ridicule.”
174
  The intellectually arrogant person 
is one who thinks his intelligence exempts him from considering other points of view.  
He feels that he does not need to listen to others because of his “privileged epistemic 
position,” which in fact is an illusion or ought to be tempered by the realization that no 
person or position (besides God) has a monopoly on knowledge.  Roberts and Wood 
point out that humility is more conducive to knowledge acquisition because “the humble 
inquirer has more potential teachers than his less humble counterparts.”
175
 
Intellectual humility may seem to be synonymous with the virtue of open-
mindedness, and certainly, the two are connected in some ways.  However, as James 
Spiegel points out, “One can be open-minded about particular issues (e.g. whether the 
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Is intellectual humility compatible with religious devotion?  Religion often seems 
to be the very antithesis of humility insofar as it makes claims to specially privileged 
divine knowledge and authority.  While there clearly are examples of arrogance in 
religion (as there are in any domain), it does not seem to be a necessary ingredient.  In 
fact, there are many religious texts that enjoin their readers to live humbly.  For example, 
James 4:10 (NIV) says, “Humble yourselves before the Lord” and Philippians 2:3 says, 
“Do nothing out of selfish ambition or vain conceit, but in humility consider others better 
than yourselves.”  Nevertheless, some might think that humility entails doubt, and 
believers are not supposed to doubt, which is the opposite of faith.  However, it not clear 
that doubt and faith are entirely opposed.  For example, consider the life of Mother 
Teresa.  In her posthumously published writings, it has become clear that she was 
plagued by doubts about God.
177
  Nevertheless, she still is the model of religious 
devotion, if there ever was one.  No, intellectual humility does not preclude religious 
convictions.  If it did, it would likely preclude the holding of beliefs in any domain.  
What it does preclude is holding beliefs with such certainty that the believer ceases to 
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 Autonomy means “self-governing,” which means being your own person.  
Beauchamp and Childress describe the moral virtue of autonomy in terms of agents who 
act “(1) intentionally, (2) with understanding, and (3) without controlling influences that 
determine their action.”
178
  The intellectual virtue of autonomy is the ability and 
willingness to think for oneself when appropriate.  The corresponding vice is called 
“heteronomy,” which means being regulated by others when one should be regulating 
oneself.   
The virtue of autonomy does not preclude being regulated by others when 
appropriate; in fact, it is often necessary, but Roberts and Wood describe an example of 
someone who is hyper-autonomous.
179
  Such a person never relies on others, never 
submits to the teaching of another, and always insists that she discover the truth on her 
own.  Such a person would lack knowledge in important ways, never trusting sources of 
information that are trustworthy.  Roberts and Wood describe when “hetero-regulation” is 
appropriate such as in learning from experts in a particular field, or submitting one‟s own 
thoughts to the criticism of others, or in modeling one‟s thinking after one‟s mentors.
180
 
On the other hand, it is easy to think of examples of people who are overly 
regulated by others.  Roberts and Wood describe such a thinker in the following way:  
When he follows a rule of inference, he must not only have the rule dictated to 
him by some authority…but he must have guidance in how to apply the rule to the 
present case…When he does an experiment, he must be guided at every step by 
his research director.  He never “plays” with vocabulary, but must be able to find 
exactly the required meaning in a dictionary, and regularly needs confirmation by 
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a teacher that the meaning he thinks he has found is indeed the required 
meaning…He takes course after course in the university, collecting notebooks full 
of lecture dictation that he duly memorizes, but never ventures to put any of the 
ideas together in his own way.
181
 
Such a thinker may benefit from the knowledge of others, but he fails to make much use 
of it.  He may be regulated by others out of fear of being wrong, but more likely he is so 
because he has never learned to think for himself.   
Roberts and Wood entertain the question whether religious people can submit 
themselves to a religious authority, or a hetero-regulator, and still be considered 
autonomous.
182
  For example, Christians believe the Bible is authoritative and submit to 
its teachings; some would consider this vicious heteronomy.  Roberts and Woods explain, 
as above, that no one is (or should be) completely autonomous.  As they put it, 
“Autonomy is an ability to resist improper hetero-regulators,”
183
 and they say, 
“[Autonomy] is a disposition and ability to resist some hetero-regulators by virtue of 
obedience to another hetero-regulator.”
184
  However, autonomy in this sense, say Roberts 
and Wood, is autonomy in the true sense to the extent that it is a matter of standing on 
one‟s own two feet.
185
  In other words, autonomous individuals submit to a hetero-
regulator, but understand why they are doing so.  Autonomy is not blind.  In addition, 
when the pressure from multiple, conflicting hetero-regulators is great, the opportunities 
to grow in autonomy increase because individuals are faced with choices and are given 
the chance to reflect on the reasons for choosing one hetero-regulator over another.  
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Submission to a hetero-regulator comes in degrees.  Glenn Graber says, “I may trust my 
priest‟s interpretation of scripture – but I will still sort through my own reactions to what 
he says; and if he says something that I find harder to accept, I may at least modulate the 
strength of my belief to reflect the degree of my doubt.  My default position may be to 
accept what he says, but that default can be overridden.”
186
 
Autonomous adherence to a hetero-regulator is not merely deference to an 
authority, but it is also “understanding in terms of the hetero-regulator.”
187
  This means 
that the autonomous individual will not only believe what the hetero-regulator believes, 
but also understand what the conflicting points of views are as understood by his 
preferred religious authority and as understood by the hetero-regulator being resisted.  
This requires intellectual courage and critical reflection.  Autonomous adherence also 
requires a deep appropriation of the beliefs of the hetero-regulator so that the beliefs 
become a part of the self.  Roberts and Wood explain: “To think in terms of a hetero-
regulator is to love in terms of the hetero-regulator, to care, to be concerned, to be 
emotionally involved in those terms…Sometimes autonomy has been thought of as 
disinterested…but on the present analysis, autonomy is not a property of the intellect as a 
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A Set of Conditions for Clinical Case Evaluations
189
 
 While the PRB and the above analysis of intellectual virtues provide the 
normative basis for judging which religious beliefs and M-requests should be honored in 
the clinic, caregivers might find more helpful a set of conditions that are more concrete.  
James Buryska proposes the following set of principles to determine which M-requests to 
honor: A request is more defensible if (1) it does not violate a physician‟s conscience, (2) 
it is based on negative rights, not positive ones, (3) it is grounded in a community, and (4) 
it is made by one willing to accept the burden of responsibility.
190
  These principles are 
instructive and illuminating, but some of them are more helpful than others.  For 
example, the community principle – verifying that a belief is based in the teachings of a 
community – seems to be a necessary condition (I say more about this below), but 
consideration of a physician‟s conscience seems less important because such conflict is 
inevitable if these requests violate the standard of care by definition (if requests are not 
“inappropriate,” then it is a non-issue).  Space does not permit me to critique Buryska‟s 
principles in detail.  Instead, I will propose a different set of conditions that I feel are 
more useful in the clinic, called MVRB conditions hereafter:
191
   
1. The belief is shared by a community. 
2. The belief is deeply held. 
3. The belief would pass the test of a religious interpreter. 
4. The belief does not harm others. 
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These conditions are not simply pass/fail; assessment can fall on a spectrum from 
“satisfies” or “mostly satisfies” to “fails” or “mostly fails to satisfy.”  The more 
conditions satisfied, the more weight ought to be given to the religious belief.  The fewer 
conditions satisfied, the less consideration it receives.  
 
The Conditions 
1. The belief is shared by a community 
Michael Wreen suggests this condition, saying that values that transcend the 
individual carry more weight than ones that are based on idiosyncratic choices.
192
  He 
compares a person who refuses lifesaving treatment on the basis of a traditional religious 
belief and one who does so because he flipped a coin to decide his fate.  It seems absurd 
to assign the same weight to the two requests even if coin-flipping carries deep 
metaphysical significance to the patient. 
Still, one could object that community matters less than existential import; in 
other words, religious beliefs are as various and unique as the people who hold them, and 
whether they are peculiar or not does not affect how deeply held they are or nullify the 
“integrating and reconciling” function they play.  This is, I take it, part of the motivation 
behind Julian Savulescu‟s criticism of Robert Orr and Leigh Genesen‟s paper, “Requests 
for „Inappropriate‟ Treatment Based on Religious Beliefs,” namely that atheists (whose 
community may not be clearly defined) are discriminated against.
193
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However, religious beliefs that are held by many do seem to have greater weight 
than beliefs that are held by a lone maverick for the following reasons: first, even though 
the maverick‟s personal religious convictions might be carefully thought out and deeply 
held, this individual does not benefit from the epistemic resources available in the 
community such as a division of labor, a wealth of experts, and a long tradition.  Second, 
a benefit of community is found in peer accountability, the regular subjection of one‟s 
beliefs to scrutiny, which helps to eliminate aberrant and anti-social beliefs.
194
  Third, 
John Hardwig argues that there are many things that we cannot know if we are 
independent and self-reliant; our knowledge naturally depends on communities of trust 
relationships.
195
  Finally, Buryska explains that a community provides “a supportive 
structure of psychic and physical resources” that helps individuals make choices that they 
would otherwise be incapable of.
196
   
The size of the community is relevant here too.  If the religious belief has few 
adherents, this should count against the belief; if the belief is a constituent of one of the 
world‟s great religions, this counts in its favor.  Some would argue that this rules out the 
beliefs of religious reformers, such as Buddha or Jesus, because their communities have 
few members at the time the movement begins.  However, reformers often identify to 
some extent with the community they are attempting to reform.  The Buddha, in his day, 
could have been identified as part of Hindu culture; and Jesus was part of the Jewish 
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community.  To the extent that their beliefs are similar to their background cultures, they 
would satisfy this criterion.  Nevertheless, what makes reformers unique in their contexts 
is that they hold a number of different beliefs; and if it is these beliefs upon which a 
medical request is made, then the reformer fares poorly.   I see no practical way of 
avoiding this outcome: a few saints may not get the medical care they deserve.  But I am 
not too concerned about ultimate justice here, nor do I think I should be.  What I am 
suggesting is that sharing a religious belief with a larger community makes the belief, 
prima facie, more virtuous – and thus more relevant to the medical establishment than 
idiosyncratic beliefs.  A few admirable reformers might be left out, but if our medical 
practice recognizes a large number of mainstream religious beliefs, then I think the cost is 
worth it.  At any rate, scoring low on this condition (having a small community) does not 
automatically disqualify a treatment request because there are other factors to consider.  
A figure like the Buddha would likely pass the other conditions below with flying colors, 
so the reformer objection carries little weight.  
This community condition is tied to the virtue of autonomy.  As mentioned 
earlier, proper autonomy does not preclude being regulated by others when appropriate, 
and hetero-regulation is often necessary; otherwise, we would lack knowledge in 
important ways.  
 
2. The belief is deeply held 
Orr and Genesen argue that it is not enough that the belief in question is widely 
held; it must also be deeply held: “What makes religious values „special‟ is not only that 
they are shared by a community, but more importantly, that they are incorporated by the 
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individual into his or her persona.  Religious values are thus more intrinsic than [many] 
other shared values because they deal with the very meaning of life.”
197
  This would rule 
out beliefs that are mere cultural baggage.  For example, people who think that because 
they were born in East Tennessee they must be Christian are simply carrying the label, 
especially if Christian doctrine has little impact on their deeper sense of identity.  
As Wreen points out, some people hold the most peculiar and trivial beliefs.  
Someone might for example have a belief in red objects, that the world would be a better 
place if these objects were maximized.
198
  Nevertheless, Wreen suggests that these beliefs 
do not carry the same weight because (1) religious values are more important to people, 
(2) the U.S. Constitution does not provide special protection for red object beliefs, (3) 
religious beliefs are not clearly true or false while beliefs about red objects are, and (4) 
religious beliefs fit into a rational person‟s life in the way beliefs about red objects 
cannot, namely they describe the human condition, provide a person with a sense of 
identity, and make sense of the world.
199
 
However, it appears as a matter of empirical fact that trivial beliefs are often held 
in the same manner as traditional religious beliefs.  Moreover, some would still say they 
see no real difference between the merits of deeply believing apparently trivial things and 
believing in religion.  “Whatever does it for you,” one might say: “Worshiping God or 
rebuilding old Mustangs.”  To the former claim, I concede.  Certainly, it is cognitively 
possible to hold beliefs about trivial things in a deep way, but so what?  We should 
ascribe a certain level of consideration to any belief just because it is deeply held – 
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whether it is in red objects or in restoring old cars – but this does not mean that all deeply 
held beliefs are equal.  To say that there is no real difference between trivial and religious 
beliefs seems clearly false.  Religion – with its literature, rituals and saints – has played a 
central and sacred role in human society since the beginning, a role that is only poorly 
fulfilled by ordinary activities.  Huston Smith says, “The finitude of mundane existence 
cannot satisfy the human heart completely.  Built into the human makeup is a longing for 
„more‟ that the world of everyday experience cannot requite.”
200
  So, even if trivial 
beliefs can be deeply held, there is something about the human experience that such 
beliefs fail to capture.  
Another concern is that it would be too difficult for a caregiver to separate out, in 
practice, those who hold their religion deeply from those who do not.
201
  For example, a 
patient may profess to be a Christian, but only to satisfy her family.  How can we 
distinguish these patients from other more or less committed Christians?  I grant that this 
is a problem for applying my criteria, but if it is devastating, it is not uniquely destructive 
to my project alone, for often physicians have no other recourse in making tough medical 
decisions than to trust the testimony of the patient or make their best judgment.  This is 
the case, for example, in trying to decide whether a surrogate is acting out of the best 
interest of the patient – the problem is one of judging psychological factors or moral 
character. 
The “deeply held” condition is tied to the virtues of firmness and autonomy.  A 
believer who exemplifies the virtue of firmness will hold her beliefs deeply.  She will be 
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firm, but not rigid.  She will be firm, but not intellectually flabby.  Shallow believers are 
often dogmatic or too easily swayed.  The condition is also tied to autonomy insofar as 
autonomy involves a deep appropriation of the beliefs in question, a deep appropriation 
of the beliefs of the hetero-regulator.  
 
3. The belief would pass the test of a religious interpreter 
Orr and Genesen suggest involving a religious interpreter when no one on the 
care-giving team is familiar with the religion of the patient.
202
  The interpreter could 
fulfill many responsibilities including the following: (1) a support for the patient and the 
family, (2) someone to help articulate the patient‟s belief to the physician, and (3) 
someone to help articulate the physician‟s point of view to the patient. 
The responsibilities of a religious interpreter could be fulfilled by a hospital 
chaplain or social worker, who – in either case – is familiar with the particular religion or 
a wide variety of traditions.  The interpreter might also be the patient‟s own pastor, priest, 
or advisor as long as this individual is able and willing to communicate with hospital 
staff.  In rare cases when there are no local representatives of the religion, the caregivers 
may need to call on a religious studies professor from a local college who has spent time 
studying sects similar to the patient‟s.  
As an interpreter, the individual would play the mediating role of third party to a 
conflict, which provides an objective neutral ground from which to facilitate productive 
communication.  This role has already been used successfully in cultural and political 
contexts and is also employed to solve interpersonal conflicts such as in marriage.  
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Surely, it would work in this situation as well.  In addition, the interpreter might assist in 
evaluating whether the patient fully understands the situation, whether the belief is shared 
by a community, and whether it is deeply held (assisting the caregiver in employing the 
other criteria).  Moreover, the interpreter would be in the best position to evaluate 
whether the patient‟s belief was recently acquired or whether it is a long-held conviction.  
Orr and Genesen describe cases of “fox-hole religion,” which are similar to deathbed 
conversions in that they occur under great stress.  It is implied that a long-held belief 
carries more weight than one that is adopted under duress, the former type is one that is 
more likely to fulfill the functions Wreen describes. 
One worry is whether being a practitioner of the religion makes an interpreter 
better or worse; would religious devotion negatively affect one‟s ability to fulfill these 
responsibilities?  I think this is a valid concern, but religious devotion (or non-devotion) 
should not automatically disqualify an interpreter.  It is possible that religious 
commitment might make mediation too difficult, but it is also possible to be too 
objective, failing to really understand the point of view of the religious believer.  Both 
parties (especially the physicians who are charged with carrying out a treatment request) 
must evaluate each interpreter anew to decide whether he or she can act effectively.  
Obviously, the position of a religious interpreter requires a certain amount of objectivity 
and open-mindedness in order to listen successfully, but simply adhering to a religion 
does not make this impossible any more than it does for a cultural translator who 
identifies more closely with one culture and language over another.  
90 
 
The religious interpreter condition is tied to the virtues of the love of knowledge, 
humility, and autonomy.  From the point of view of the caregivers, there should be a 
desire to know and understand how the patient interprets her situation.  The patient must 
also shoulder some of this responsibility, and an interpreter can help both parties.  The 
condition is also tied to the virtue of humility.  The act of bringing in a third party 
acknowledges the need for help in both understanding and communication.  It is also 
related to autonomy insofar as it is an example of the appropriate submission to a hetero-
regulator.  For example, if the interpreter is a leader in the patient‟s community and 
contradicts the patient‟s interpretation of her situation, then it may be appropriate to 
submit to him.  
 
4. The belief does not harm others 
A physician‟s prima facie duty is to “do no harm.”  A request for “inappropriate” 
treatment may result in harm to the patient and others, so it is necessary to reflect on how 
much harm we would be willing to permit in the name of autonomy and religious 
freedom.   
First, there is harm to the self, which may make little sense from an outsider‟s 
perspective, but we ought to acknowledge the deep role that religion plays in making 
sense of personal suffering and death.  For example, a Jehovah‟s Witness‟ refusal of a 
blood transfusion may look like a needless death from the outside, but to the patient it is 
an act of obedience to God.  The patient views the benefits of the afterlife as more 
desirable than the goods of this life.  However, James Childress raises a relevant point: 
“when a person is seriously maiming himself…forcible intervention is warranted because 
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of the heavy burden and costs such injuries impose on others.”
203
  Childress‟ point 
demonstrates that there is often more at stake than the interests of the patient.  Although 
we ought to respect patient autonomy, potential harm to others may be grounds to deny a 
treatment request.   
  In some cases, patients may make decisions that ignore the interests of their 
families and result in great harm financially, emotionally, or physically.  This is a matter 
of great concern and should be discussed with patients and family members prior to 
approving any such request.  Caregivers should consider the harm done to others and 
whether those affected are willingly affected – they may, in fact, share the religious 
belief.  In addition, a patient‟s decision might harm other patients, the most obvious case 
being the problem of scarce medical resources.  Such concerns would likely override the 
patient‟s autonomy. 
 The most difficult case, however, is when the religious belief is held by a parent, 
and the treatment request harms a child.  This is difficult because under normal 
circumstances most feel that parental choices ought to be respected even when they entail 
a certain amount of risk or danger for the child such as taking children skydiving.  
However, when it comes to medical care, the law has tended to frown on decisions – 
religiously motivated or not – that entail great risks for children.  In Prince v. 
Massachusetts (1944) the Supreme Court decided that individuals may be free to make 
martyrs of themselves, but not of their children.  I will explore this problem more deeply 
later. 
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 In sum, a “no harm” condition is essential if for no other reasons than to reinforce 
the Hippocratic Oath; this condition is defeasible such as in some cases of self-harm, but 
it serves as a safeguard against runaway patient autonomy and a prevention of harm done 
to others.  If it can be demonstrated that minimal harm will occur and the belief satisfies 
the other conditions, then the request may be granted.  
 The no-harm condition is tied to the virtue of compassion.  Beauchamp and 
Childress define the virtue as “a trait that combines an attitude of active regard for 
another‟s welfare with an imaginative awareness and emotional response of deep 
sympathy, tenderness, and discomfort at another‟s misfortune or suffering.”
204
  Both 
physicians and patients should exemplify this virtue.  
 
Conclusion 
 Off hand, I can think of two other criteria that might be relevant: (1) that patients 
understand the medical situation and the consequences related to their requests and (2) 
that patients show a willingness to reason about or discuss their beliefs with the 
caregivers of whom they are making the request.  I believe that the former criterion is 
essential, but I have chosen not to address it here because it is a purely epistemic criterion 
and it is sufficiently addressed by Adrienne M. Martin in “Tales Publicly Allowed: 
Competence, Capacity, and Religious Belief.”
205
  The latter criterion is also an epistemic 
one, but I fear that it would be too limiting, ruling out many religious believers – 
individuals who are not used to defending their faith and ones who believe that reasons 
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cannot be given for faith.  One way to include this condition would be to make it 
subjunctive: if the patient were able or willing to reason about it, could a case be made in 
its favor?  Whether this is a workable criterion is questionable, but even if it is, I believe 
that the same concerns are addressed by the religious interpreter condition, making this 
criterion redundant.  
Certainly, the MVRB conditions could be further expanded, clarified, or limited; I 
am sure that they are not yet complete, but my purpose here has been to simply suggest a 
basic framework within which to separate medically valid religious beliefs from ones not 
worthy of consideration.  It is important to remember that these criteria are not “all or 
nothing;” some religious beliefs might have more of one and less of another.  I take this 
as a merit of the approach because it does not pretend to draw an absolute line, which 
separates those on the “inside” from those on the “outside.”  Each request would need to 
be evaluated by the criteria independently.  Each condition is informed by a principle that 
is widely accepted as a virtue in the intellectual or moral life.  For example, the 
community and deeply-held conditions are based on the intellectual virtue of autonomy 










Application of the PRB and MVRB Conditions 
 
 
      Jehovah‟s Witnesses give two main reasons for rejecting blood transfusions: (1) 
medical risk and (2) the command of God.  The Mayo Clinic website says, “Blood 
transfusion is a common procedure that usually goes without complications.  But there 
are some risks.”
206
  The website lists the following risks: (1) allergic reactions, (2) fever, 
(3) lung injury, (4) bloodborne infections like HIV, (5) iron overload, (6) acute immune 
hemolytic reaction, (7) delayed hemolytic reaction, and (8) graft-versus-host disease.
207
  
JW literature stresses these risks, so much so that an outsider might get the idea that this 
is the only reason JWs have to reject transfusions.
208
   
While it must be granted that blood transfusions entail some medical risk, the 
amount of concern shown by JWs is not medically warranted, especially if such worries 
prevent patients from ever opting for a transfusion.  First, it appears to be irrational, based 
on a logical error.  Interpreting JW literature at face value might lead a JW to the 
following (invalid) logical deduction: 
(1) There is a risk of dying from a blood transfusion. (true) 
(2) I will require a blood transfusion if I am to have this operation. (true) 
(3) Therefore, if I have this operation, I will probably die.209  
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The conclusion does not follow from the premises.  Second, if medical risk is the main 
concern, then it would logically follow that JWs, who say they have a high regard for life, 
would sometimes accept a transfusion if the risk of rejecting it would amount to certain 
death.
210
  But they do not do so.  Therefore, it is obvious that medical risk is not playing 
the role that JWs contend.  At best, it is a secondary reason, so I will set it aside for the 
moment.  The main reason for JWs to refuse blood products is that they believe that God 
prohibits transfusions.  Is such a belief rational?   
There is nothing inherently irrational about belief in God.  In fact, much has been 
written in defense of the rationality of belief in God; take, for example, the book The 
Rationality of Theism by Paul Copan and Paul Moser.
211
  Contributors to the book 
include William P. Alston, Stephen T. Davis, William Lane Craig, and Charles 
Taliaferro.  Copan and Moser say in the introduction that theism is experiencing a 
renaissance in intellectual circles, and they refer to atheist philosopher Quentin Smith 
who laments the return of religious belief: 
Much to Smith‟s dismay, it became clear that “realist theists were not outmatched 
by naturalists in terms of the most valued standards of analytic philosophy: 
conceptual precision, rigor of argumentation, technical erudition, and an in-depth 
defense of an original world-view.” All the while naturalists have “passively 
watched” as the influence of theistic philosophy has soared: “perhaps one-quarter 
or one-third of philosophy professors are theists, with most being orthodox 
Christians.”   Smith concedes: “God is not „dead‟ in academia; he returned to life 





Contributors to the book argue that theism offers the best answers to some of the most 
difficult philosophical questions such as why something exists rather than nothing.  In 
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chapter six, “The Cosmological Argument,” William Lane Craig describes and defends 
one argument for the existence of God called the kalam cosmological argument, which 
says, (1) whatever begins to exist has a cause, (2) the universe began to exist, and 
therefore, (3) the universe has a cause.
213
  Philosophical arguments like these demonstrate 
that theism can be a rational belief.  
In addition, there is nothing inherently irrational about belief in a God who gives 
moral commands.  The God of Christian theism has traditionally been conceived as a 
morally perfect being, one who creates free creatures and desires them to flourish.  
Divine moral commands are rationally conceivable as a means to the flourishing of free 
creatures.  While divine command theory may be out of vogue these days as a moral 
philosophy among professional ethicists, it still has its defenders among analytic 
philosophers.
214
  So, if JW beliefs are irrational, then they are irrational for some other 
reason. 
Is it irrational to believe that God would require his people to refuse the medical 
use of blood products?  To answer this question we would need to determine whether the 
following JW beliefs (mentioned in chapter one) are compatible with PRB:  
1. Armageddon is near, in which all mankind will be destroyed except faithful 
JWs who will live forever on earth;  
2. The WTS governing body is believed to be the “faithful and discreet slave” 
referred to in Jesus‟ parable at Matthew 24:45, divinely appointed by Jesus 
Christ to lead JWs;  
3. The Bible cannot be understood without interpretation by the “faithful and 
discreet slave”; 
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4. JWs who openly criticize the leadership and the organization are regarded as 
apostates, disloyal to Jesus and God;  
5. Salvation is contingent on how well they perform as loyal JWs215 
Some of these beliefs are based on a particular interpretation (hermeneutic) and 
application of specific Bible passages.  To discover whether such beliefs are compatible 
with PRB, we need to ask what intellectual virtues are relevant in hermeneutics and 
whether such hermeneutical virtues are compatible with the JW reading of the Bible.   
 Interpreting the Bible is a practice engaged in by a living tradition, a collection of 
diverse but related religious communities that see the Bible as authoritative for faith and 
practice.  As Alasdair MacIntyre says, “A living tradition…is an historically extended, 
socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which 
constitute that tradition…What then sustains and strengthens traditions?  What weakens 
and destroys them? …The answer in key part is: the exercise or the lack of exercise of the 
relevant virtues.”
216
  As Stephen E. Fowl points out, Christians through the centuries have 
shown a tendency to rationalize their own evil practices, such as slavery, by ignoring the 
intellectual virtues in their hermeneutics.
217
  He says that a Christian theology of sin (that 
human beings are fallen and prone to self-justification and rationalization – even while 
reading Scripture) should inform Christian interpretive practices, encouraging Christians 
to remain “vigilant over their interpretation.”
218
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The virtues relevant to biblical interpretation are, at least in part, the intellectual 
virtues mentioned above: the love of knowledge, firmness, courage and caution, humility, 
and autonomy.  If JWs cultivate the love of knowledge, then they would welcome 
opportunities to test their beliefs and would not reject dialogue and debate with others in 
the (Christian) tradition regarding the correct interpretation of Scripture.  However, it is 
unclear that this is the case.  If Muramoto is correct, “Jehovah‟s Witnesses have been 
strongly discouraged from discussing critical religious issues with outsiders, particularly 
with former members, and can be „disfellowshiped‟ (excommunicated) for doing so.”
219
  
It is one thing to require that members of the community adhere to community practices, 
this conforms to the virtue of community integrity that is alluded to by Donald T. Ridley 
in response to Muramoto: “Muramoto‟s suggestion that each individual should be free to 
disregard the community‟s scriptural teachings and standards and yet remain a member of 
the community is preposterous.”
220
  However, it is quite another thing to prohibit 
members of the community from discussing or testing their beliefs with those who 
believe otherwise.  The practice of excommunication is, to the extent that it is not 
coercive, compatible with the love of knowledge; the closed-minded practices that 
Muramoto refers to is not.  
 Such an unwillingness to sincerely consider other interpretations is an example of 
other vices as well, such as being overly cautious.  Being overly cautious, in this case, 
appears to be a manipulative practice based on the fear that members of the community 
might come to embrace other interpretations or simply abandon ship.  This separation 
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from other Christians is also an example of the vice of arrogance.  Insofar as The 
Watchtower enjoins its members not to listen to others, it is commanding them to act in 
an arrogant manner.  Intellectual humility would require JWs to recognize that only God 
has a monopoly on knowledge and much can be learned in discussion with others, 
especially with those who disagree with you.  In addition, this separation from others 
appears to be an example of the vice of improper hetero-regulation, which occurs in this 
case because The Watchtower does not cultivate the virtue of intellectual autonomy, or 
the ability of its members to think for themselves. 
MacIntyre adds to these virtues an additional one: “the virtue of having an 
adequate sense of the traditions to which one belongs or which confront one.”
221
  It is 
unclear whether JWs have an adequate sense of their tradition, especially in light of the 
beliefs above, in which JWs view themselves as the only beneficiary of God‟s 
enlightening and saving grace.  Instead, JWs need to view themselves as belonging to a 
larger tradition of religious groups who hold the Bible to be authoritative.  
The JW rejection of blood is based on its unique interpretation and application of 
particular scriptural passages, as seen in chapter one.  The Watchtower asserts that only 
its interpretations of these passages, no matter how implausible, are valid because The 
Watchtower is “the faithful and discreet slave” of Matthew 24:45.  It is unclear how such 
authority is supposed to follow logically from this passage even if the “slave” is 
identified with The Watchtower.  No other major Christian group stakes its claim to 
ecclesiastical authority on this passage, and it seems to be quite a stretch to do so here.  
                                                 
221
 MacIntyre, 223 
100 
 
Since its claim to ecclesiastical and hermeneutical authority starts on such shaky rational 
footing, any further Watchtower interpretations are suspect.  
 Julian Savulescu and Richard W. Momeyer argue that JW beliefs are irrational in 
two ways: they are unresponsive to evidence and inconsistent.
222
  First, they argue that 
their overly literal interpretations are not open to evidence.  Such interpretations, they 
claim, ignore “historical context, the diverse intentions and circumstances of Biblical 
peoples and authors, oral and written traditions in the Middle East, other religious 
traditions and interpretations of Biblical texts, and inconsistencies between different 
canonised works.”
223
  This failing appears to be an authentic example of a failure to 
conscientiously do one‟s research and test one‟s beliefs against other in the biblical 
community.   
Second, Savulescu and Momeyer argue that JWs ought to recognize that their 
own beliefs are inconsistent.  They explain, as an example, that the JW prohibition 
against the consumption of blood is incompatible with the practice of communion, in 
which followers of Jesus drink the “blood” (wine) of Jesus.
224
  Another example of 
inconsistency, they claim, is the teachings of Saint Paul, who taught that believers are not 
to be slaves to the law, but ought to live by faith.
225
   
While Savulescu and Momeyer‟s first criticism may be valid (that JW 
interpretations are unresponsive to evidence), it is not clear that their second criticism is 
successful.  The comparison of blood transfusion to the practice of communion may fail 
                                                 
222
 Savulescu and Momeyer, 282-288 
223
 Savulescu and Momeyer, 284. 
224
 Savulescu and Momeyer, 284. 
225
 Galatians 3:10,13,24-25 
101 
 
to take into account what JWs actually believe about the nature of blood consumption.  If 
Richard Singelenberg‟s analysis is correct, then the underlying reason for not consuming 
the blood of other human beings is to avoid pollution with apostates.
226
  According to JW 
beliefs, it is possible even for current Jehovah‟s Witnesses to apostatize, so consuming 
only the blood of fellow members is no guarantee against pollution.  Consuming the 
blood of Jesus Christ, however, may be safe enough, given his sinless nature.  In fact, 
being united with Christ is a common Christian teaching; however, The Watchtower does 
not teach the transubstantiation of the communion elements, i.e. the wine becoming 
blood, like the Catholics.  They believe, like many other Protestant denominations, that 
the elements are only symbols of the body and blood of Jesus, eaten in remembrance.
227
  
So, the comparison ultimately fails.   
The second point about Paul‟s teaching is also weak.  Paul, in this passage, is 
warning the church in Galatia about the dangers of certain false teachers in their midst 
(the so-called Judaizers), who were trying to convince the Gentile believers to be 
circumcised like the Jewish believers.  Paul is not teaching antinomianism here, or that all 
moral rules are bad, for he prescribes other moral practices in his letters.  Instead, he is 
trying to combat the tendency of believers to rely on old Jewish traditions rather than 
faith.  Anyway, Paul himself delivered the “blood” message to the Gentile believers in 
Acts about the prohibition of consuming blood, so, Savulescu and Momeyer‟s charge of 
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  Nevertheless, even if the charge of inconsistency fails, the first 
charge of irrationality may stick. 
However, before we decide whether to honor JW M-requests, it will be helpful to 
determine whether JW M-requests satisfy the MVRB conditions: whether the M-requests 
are based on religious beliefs that (1) are held by a community, (2) are deeply held, (3) 
would pass the test of a religious interpreter, and (4) do no harm.  The first is the 
community condition.  JWs number close to seven million worldwide, and while the 
seven million figure does not come close to the number of followers in any of the world‟s 
great religions (consider the 1.5 billion followers of Islam
229
), it is not a small religion by 
any means.  In addition, the blood mandate is widely taught and carefully adhered to.  
The authority of the Watchtower on this issue extends to the JW community worldwide, 
at least regarding the use of whole blood products.  The Watchtower leaves the question 
of the use of blood components up to local communities.  
The second condition is whether the belief is deeply held.  Such a condition needs 
to be applied on a case by case basis – many JWs are sincerely committed to these 
beliefs, but many are not.  Stories abound in the medical community of patients who are 
relieved to have blood transfusions forced upon them.  Such patients feel coerced by their 
community to refuse blood, but deep inside they want to continue living by whatever 
means possible.  Discerning whether coercion is playing a role is difficult, but it is a 
challenge that healthcare providers must accept as part of the job, and not just with JW 
patients.  The difficulties of ferreting out coercion can be mitigated if the patient can be 
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spoken with alone separate from other family or church members.  In such a situation, the 
question can be posed: “We understand what you are asking for, but we would like to 
know whether you would be relieved if we took the choice out of your hands and simply 
gave you the transfusion against your will.”  An affirmative response to this question is 
often possible because of the understanding that the Watchtower will absolve its 
followers of any responsibility if the treatment is forced upon them.  However, if the 
Witness is deeply against being transfused, then this counts in favor of honoring the M-
request. 
The third condition is the religious interpreter test.  Would the blood transfusion 
refusal pass the test of a religious interpreter?  It probably would.  As mentioned above, 
such requests are quite common and the beliefs upon which they are based are widely 
held among JWs.  It is also widely known and discussed among medical practitioners, so 
there is no reason to believe that it would fail this condition.  If anything, this M-request 
represents the best example of when a clear, well-established religious teaching conflicts 
with the standard of care.  Religious interpreters in these cases, then, would fulfill other 
roles such as mediating between hospital staff and the patient and making sure that both 
parties understand one another.  Even though this M-request is widely discussed among 
medical practitioners, it is not always honored by medical staff.  I recall a story in which 
a medical resident knew that an unconscious patient was a JW, but proceeded with a 
blood transfusion anyway “in the patient‟s interest” and was later reprimanded.  An 
interpreter who is present in the clinic could help prevent such mistakes from occurring 
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and also inform the caregiver of treatment alternatives that would be compatible with the 
patient‟s request.  
The fourth condition is the no harm condition.  Certainly, harm will occur in 
many cases if a blood transfusion is refused; however, if the M-request is made by a 
competent patient and it satisfies the “deeply held” condition, then it must be weighed 
against the harms perceived by the patient.  The patient is making a judgment between 
physical and spiritual harm where the perceived eternal benefits outweigh the earthly 
physical costs.  When such a death occurs, it may be considered “tragic” by hospital staff, 
but it probably does not, as James Childress says, inflict a high cost on them.  As 
mentioned in chapter four, Childress makes the point that there is more at stake than just 
the interests of the patients.  The interests of others related to the patient and of the 
hospital staff need to be taken into consideration.
230
  In the balance, the interests of the 
patient outweigh the interests of others here, so the M-request passes this condition. 
In conclusion, JW M-requests satisfy the MVRB conditions but fail PRB.  This 
shows that the MVRB conditions are more liberal than PRB and would allow irrational 
beliefs.  This is acceptable.  Until now, I have not said much about the modern emphasis 
on autonomy, according to which we feel that competent adult patients should make 
decisions about their own care.  Competency is not the same as rationality.  Adult 
patients can be judged competent to make certain decisions about their healthcare while 
being irrational; for example, a patient might have an aversion to taking medicine and 
might prefer to seek out alternative therapies to treat her illness before filling her doctor‟s 
prescription.  The doctor may feel that such an action is irrational, but the patient could 
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still be competent enough to make the decision.  Rationality, in terms of PRB, is a higher 
standard than simple competency. 
On the other hand, Julian Savluescu and Richard W. Momeyer explain, “We do 
not respect autonomy when we encourage people to act on irrational beliefs.  Rather, such 
beliefs limit a person‟s autonomy.”
231
  According to this perspective, an autonomous 
decision is a rational decision, not merely a competent one.  If this is the case, then it 
seems that we must promote rationality with much more vigor.  But this may be difficult 
in a system that has come to view “autonomy” as making decisions about one‟s own care, 
whether rational or not.   
There are many theories of autonomy, but Beauchamp and Childress define 
autonomy as “self-rule that is free from both controlling interference by others and from 
limitations, such as inadequate understanding, that prevent meaningful choice.”
232
  Under 
this view, a patient may not be forming beliefs in a fully virtuous manner and may lack 
many moral virtues such as concern for family members; nevertheless, she may be 
making the decisions herself and fully understand the consequences.  As caregivers, we 
might encourage her to rethink her decisions, but in the end, I believe that it is right to 
respect them, which, in other words, is respect for autonomy.  
To accommodate patient autonomy in this sense, then, the threshold of honoring 
M-requests must be lower for competent adults.  If such requests pass the MVRB 
conditions, they should be honored.  The more strict PRB should only be applied when 
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the stakes are higher such as when the lives of children are at risk, but I will say more 
about this in the next chapter.  
 
MVRB Conditions and the Golubchuk Case 
In a recent article in the Scottish Journal of Healthcare Chaplaincy, Robert 
Mundle applies my MVRB conditions to the Samuel Golubchuk case.
233
  He raises some 
serious questions, especially with the religious interpreter condition.  
 First, he thinks that the community condition is unhelpful.  He says: 
On the one hand, a leading expert in Jewish medical ethics – Rabbi Dr. Edward 
Reichman – stated that the “overwhelming majority” of rabbinic authorities would 
prohibit removal of Mr. Golubchuck‟s ventilator, if doing so would have led to 
his death…On the other hand, Rabbi Chaim David Halevi, the late Sefardi 
Orthodox Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv, once stated that it is prohibited to prolong life 
artificially when there is no longer any hope for the patient. He said that in such 
cases it is not only permissible to disconnect the machine, but it is mandatory to 
do so, in that ventilators can cause the soul to suffer rather than the body by 
preventing it from departing and going to its rest and peace…And side-stepping 
the religious debate altogether, yet another rabbi argued that the Golubchuk case 
was not really a “Jewish” issue at all, but that its scope transcended religious 




With such wide disagreement about the Golubchuk case among Orthodox Jews, Mundle 
thinks that the community condition is indeterminate; moreover, Mundle thinks that 
community consensus in any religion is “surely elusive if not illusory.”
235
  While he does 
not say so explicitly, Mundle suggests that the community condition be dropped from the 
set of conditions.  He says that the decisive factor is “existential confession rather than 
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doctrinal interpretation,” which I take to mean that what the individual patient believes is 
more important than what the community teaches. 
 While I agree that community consensus might be elusive, I see no reason to think 
that it is illusory, especially if we define “community” carefully.  There are communities 
within communities, for example, groups of Jews who are more conservative than others, 
ones who take a more vitalist position than others.  This can be seen in Mundle‟s own 
words above.  Communities and groups can be recognized at many levels within a 
religion.  Jews everywhere share some things in common, so we can identify the religion 
of Judaism.  But within it, there are Orthodox and Reformed Jews, and within those 
divisions there are even further divisions.  The community condition allows for a 
plurality of views within a tradition as long as a community can be identified whether the 
community is a “religion” or a “sect.”  Jewish vitalism may be one view in Orthodox 
Judaism and may even be in the minority (which is not apparent to me); nevertheless, it is 
held by a community of believers who have a common identity and literature. 
 For the community condition, there is a presumption that the larger the 
community, the more often its M-requests should be honored.  So, the beliefs of a group 
of religious separatists do not count for as much as the mainstream beliefs of one of the 
larger religions.  This is in keeping with the value of community-held beliefs defended 
earlier.  
 Second, Mundle thinks that the “deeply held” condition is useful in the 
Golubchuk case.  He says:  
While there is no doubt that the Golubchucks voiced their religious beliefs clearly 
and strongly, it is unclear what emotions and dynamics might have been fuelling 
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their position. From a family systems perspective, for example, the death of a 
family leader can disrupt a family system and throw it into chaos. A spiritual 
assessment in end-of-life cases could utilize a genogram to focus on how much a 
“vitalist” position might actually be driven by fear of a father‟s death and how 
that would disorient the family in its wake. Was it fear of their father‟s death that 
gripped Mr. Golubchuck‟s adult children? Or denial? Or long-standing guilt? Was 
it the burden of uncertainty about what to do that paralyzed their decision-making 





Mundle thinks that the Golubchuks‟ stated religious beliefs could be masking deeper 
issues, and asking whether the religious belief is deeply held will help physicians provide 
better care.  He also thinks that chaplains can assist the physician in this endeavor. 
 Third, Mundle is deeply concerned about the religious interpreter condition.  In 
my original paper, I nominated chaplains for the job of religious interpreter, yet Mundle 
thinks that this constitutes a conflict of interest for “non-judgmental chaplains.”
237
  He 
says, “Hospital chaplains cannot be expected to know with any real depth and accuracy 
all the details of specific beliefs and practices of multiple religious traditions, and a 
summary rehearsal of basic fundamental points risks stereotyping otherwise complex 
belief systems.”
238
  Mundle thinks that a chaplain is too fallible to provide information 
about what a patient believes.  The religious beliefs of patients are too varied and the 
systems themselves are too complicated for a chaplain to be authoritative.  He says, “The 
real „experts‟ after all are the patients and their families themselves.”
239
   
Mundle also thinks that asking chaplains to offer judgments in ethically troubling 
cases conflicts with their “pastoral sensibilities” and that most chaplains would be 
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opposed to their involvement as “interpreters.”
240
  He is a chaplain by training, and he 
describes the chaplain‟s role in a typical fashion:  
Chaplains can help build trust between patients, families, and medical teams in 
the deadlock of ethical dilemmas in ways that correspond to the main tools of 
pastoral practice…For example, chaplains provide a ministry of “presence” to 
patients and to families that enables them to tell their stories freely, ask all their 
questions without haste and fear of judgment, and contemplate their decisions 
thoroughly with an attentive and reflective listener…Instead of “religious 
interpreters” chaplains can be understood more widely as “values interpreters” 
who engage the treasury of images and symbols in which religious beliefs among 




Mundle argues that chaplains provide comfort and a listening ear and that they are not 
trained to evaluate religious beliefs.  Chaplaincy, he says, “facilitates open 
communication among equal partners, while it rejects the claim of superiority assumed 




 I understand Mundle‟s concerns.  Chaplains often perceive themselves in the sole 
business of providing spiritual care; in fact, they are often asked to do more than this in 
the clinic, but this frustrates them.  For instance, I recall a case where a chaplain was 
asked by a patient‟s physician to fix a problem, to convince the family to accept the 
recommended treatment.  This, the chaplain explained to the physician, was not part of 
his job description, but this is mistaken.  The chaplain is part of a team, a team caring for 
the patient.  While chaplains are primarily responsible for spiritual care, such care cannot 
be easily separated from patient care as a whole.  In fact, spiritual care is just one 
component of patient well-being, and if we are to treat the patient, and not just her 
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disease, then we must address every component and treat her as a whole person.  
Anyway, spiritual care is often affected by the other conditions; in other words, how you 
care for a person spiritually will depend on what the conditions of the disease are, what 
the medical treatment is, and the communication (or lack thereof) with other caregivers.  
Also, medical professionals need a complete understanding of the patient to deliver 
appropriate care, and this often requires communicating with a social worker, 
psychologist, or chaplain.  If one of these other team members is unwilling to assist, 
patient care is compromised.  More than likely, chaplains are willing to be a member of 
the team but simply want to limit their involvement to “spiritual presence,” but this is 
morally unacceptable.  If any member of the patient‟s care team has information that 
might improve the patient‟s well-being, it is incumbent on this team member to assist the 
others even if this means stepping outside one‟s usual role.  This is done for the sake of 
the patient, and chaplains of all people should be able to recognize this obligation.  
When chaplains resist attempts to enlist their assistance in caring for a patient (in 
ways other than spiritual care), there are alternatives.  First, find another chaplain, one 
willing and able to participate in an ethics consultation.  Second, ask the family‟s minister 
if she is willing to mediate.  Third, consult a professor of religious studies who is familiar 
with the religion or sect.  Also, the hospital could employ a patient advocate whose job 
description includes familiarizing herself with the religious beliefs of those served by the 
hospital.  
 In the Golubchuk case in particular, Orthodox Judaism is not an obscure religion, 
so finding someone, a chaplain or religious studies professor, who is familiar with its 
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teachings will not be difficult.  An interpreter would confirm that the Golubchuk family‟s 
beliefs are in line with traditional Jewish beliefs and could help to determine whether the 
family is in fact practicing members of that faith.  The interpreter could also serve as 
conflict mediator, which would have been useful in the Golubchuk case.  In short, it is 
likely that this case would pass the religious interpreter condition.  
 Finally, does the Golubchuk M-request pass the “no harm” condition?  Mundle 
thinks this condition is complicated.  He says, “By continuing to treat Mr. Golubchuck 
his physicians argued that they were inflicting physical harm on him, yet it also could be 
argued that he did not experience any physical pain due to his minimal brain function.”
243
  
Mundle also points out that some people would argue that the family was harming Mr. 
Golubchuk because they were not allowing his soul to go free.  On the other hand, some 
would say that the physicians were being harmed emotionally and spiritually because of 
the great toll this case was taking on them (recall that one physician resigned over it).  In 
spite of these conflicting considerations, it is not clear that continuing to treat Mr. 
Golubchuk would result in significant harm to anyone other than Mr. Golubchuk, and 
even in this instance, the harm would be mitigated by his minimal brain function.  The 
“harm” that the physicians experienced is most likely a wounded conscience, which can 
be mitigated by allowing physicians who have strong moral qualms with a procedure to 
opt out (a conscience clause).   
In short, the Golubchuk M-request should be honored.  The Manitoba guidelines 
that were released in response to this case state that physicians have the final say whether 
to continue treatment even against the desires of the family.  This is unacceptable because 
                                                 
243
 Mundle, 25 
112 
 
it is culturally insensitive and violates Nussbaum‟s Accommodation Principle discussed 
in chapter three.  
 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, I closely examined two cases.  With JW M-requests, I showed that 
while such a request might fail the PRB condition, it would satisfy the MVRB conditions.  
Since we are dealing with competent adult JWs and given the high regard for autonomy 
in the clinic, I argued that these M-requests should be honored in spite of their 
irrationality.  So, when adult patients make M-requests, it is enough simply to apply the 
MVRB conditions.  In the Golubchuk case, I did exactly that, and determined that the 



















In Prince v. Massachusetts (1944), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Sarah 
Prince, a Jehovah‟s Witness, violated child labor laws.  The 9-year-old child entrusted to 
her care was caught distributing religious literature.  The opinion of the court famously 
stated: “Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they 
are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have 
reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for 
themselves.”  The child in this case was not in physical danger; nevertheless, this case is 
often cited when parents make M-requests. 
In this chapter, I consider the dominant approach to handling M-requests for 
children and suggest that it is too insensitive and uncritical for our modern pluralistic 
society.  Until now cultural and religious beliefs have been undervalued (sometimes 
unintentionally) in this discussion.   
In some cases, the standard of care automatically trumps M-requests; medical 
professionals and courts intervene and remove children from parental custody when an 
M-request will result in great risk to a child.  This falls short of critical engagement 
because such cases are marked by a lack of consideration of the beliefs themselves – 
emphasizing only the medical risks.  In such cases, caregivers operate (consciously or 
unconsciously) on the assumption that the family‟s beliefs are false or irrelevant and that 
a secular conception of the no-harm principle trumps all competing values.   
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This is not to say that current medical practice explicitly endorses the view that 
we ought to be disrespectful of other cultures; nevertheless, the dominant approach is not 
sensitive enough.  It is too permissive in some cases and too intolerant in others because 
true respect for matters of conscience has been missing from the clinic.  Healthcare needs 
a new model for dealing with M-requests for children, one that takes the beliefs of 
parents seriously and avoids Dacey‟s “Privacy and Liberty Fallacies.”
245
  I expect that as 
a result of this move, some M-requests that are currently granted will be denied and some 




In this section, I consider Julian Savulescu‟s approach to handling M-requests for 
children.  His conditions hold parents to a high ethical standard, but, as is common, they 
undervalue cultural and religious beliefs.  He suggests the following standards for 
limiting the kinds of choices parents can make for their children: 
1. It must be safe enough, compared to other interventions children are exposed 
to. 
2. The parent‟s choices must be based on a plausible conception of well-being 
and a better life for the child and not on some idiosyncratic, unjustifiable 
conception of the good life. In addition, the choice must be based on a good 
enough expectation of realizing a good life. For this reason, while competent 
adults can refuse life-saving blood transfusions for themselves, parents cannot 
refuse life-saving blood transfusions for their children on any grounds. 
3. It must be consistent with development of autonomy and a reasonable range 
of future life plans for the child. For example, while adults may be allowed 
and even have a good reason to have one of their healthy limbs amputated, 
parents could never have the healthy limb of their child amputated for many 
reasons, including the fact that it removes a range of possible good futures 
from the child‟s grasp. Female circumcision, and the removal of an organ of 
female sexual pleasure, severely constrain the range of possible good lives for 
that child, stunting the possibility of full sexual satisfaction. It should not be 
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permitted. Male circumcision is different precisely because the possible 
consequences are more mixed and more uncertain. The reasons for accepting 
male circumcision include social and cultural considerations, as well as 
medical considerations such as reduced risk of disease (e.g., penile cancer) 




These conditions are helpful for a number of reasons.  First, they establish a strong 
presumption in favor of protecting the lives of children.  Second, they prevent religious 
liberty from becoming an unqualified absolute.  Savulescu‟s set of conditions hold beliefs 
to a high ethical standard in order to protect the lives of children, but they suffer from a 




First, it is not clear how safe is “safe enough.”  It would make a big difference if 
the basis of comparison includes all of the legitimate risks children are exposed to outside 
the hospital, like riding in cars or on bikes.
247
  This would, I think, make this condition 
very permissive; on the other hand, if the basis of comparison includes only the risks 
entailed by other medical interventions such as blood transfusions, then the condition is 
very strict.  Savulescu probably means the latter. 
If the basis of comparison only includes medical interventions, then this standard 
seems indistinguishable from the standard of care, which would mean that any conflict 
between parents and physicians ought to be resolved by ignoring the parents and their 
beliefs.  I find this too paternalistic because it violates The Principle of Parental 
Discretion, defined as the right parents have to make decisions for their children.  Allen 
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E. Buchanan and Dan W. Brock describe the reasoning given for such a principle: (1) 
parents do a better job in principle than anyone else; (2) parents bear the consequences of 
such choices, so they should have some control over the choices; (3) parents have a right 
to transmit values to their children because they need socialization and development; and 
(4) the family is an important social institution that requires freedom from oversight and 
control to work effectively.
248
  Mark Sheldon says, “More than any other institution in 
society, the family…values human beings simply because they are, not because of any 
use to which they can be put.  And, for this reason, it is probably in a child‟s best 
interest…that the family be maintained to the extent that it is…consistent with this 
objective of such nurturance.”
249
  Parens patriae – the doctrine that the state has the 
authority to intervene to protect children‟s interests – is invoked when parents fail in their 
responsibilities, and this is as it should be.  However, the difficulty with M-requests is in 
determining when parents have failed their children, and it is not clear that an M-request 
that entails more risk than other medical interventions necessarily constitutes child 
neglect or abuse.  Hence, to accommodate parental discretion, “safe enough” ought to be 
given a more permissive interpretation.     
Also, “safety” seems to mean mere physical safety to Savulescu, but this ignores 
other kinds of harms that can occur, for example, psychosocial and spiritual harms.  
Making children wards of the state may protect them physically but harm them in other 
ways that have been overlooked.  A recent example occurred when more than 460 
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children were taken into state custody when Texas authorities raided the Yearning For 
Zion compound on a tip that underage girls were being married off to older men.  
Surprisingly, an appeals court later ruled that Texas authorities had overstepped their 
bounds: “Evidence that children raised in this particular environment may some day have 
their physical health and safety threatened is not evidence that the danger is imminent 
enough to warrant invoking the extreme measure of immediate removal prior to full 
litigation of the issue.”
250
  The raid in Texas led top prosecutors in other states to assure 
the polygamist groups in their states that they would not be raided.
251
  The ruling of the 
appeals court demonstrates this point: the physical safety of children is important, but it is 
not the only concern. 
Psychosocial safety should be a consideration in deciding M-requests because 
children can suffer psychological trauma as a result of an M-request or from being taken 
into state custody.  Also, they can be harmed socially if the treatment results in their 
being marginalized in their societies.  For example, in some African societies women 
who do not undergo circumcision find it very difficult to get married.  Such a 
consideration may not ultimately justify the practice of female circumcision, but it is 
important information and should be given due weight in decision-making.  
Children can also be harmed spiritually, which, for example, may occur if the 
treatment that the M-request was intended to avoid is viewed as sinful by the community.  
The patient and the patient‟s family might be ostracized or excommunicated, resulting in 
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a fracturing of the patient‟s spiritual development.  In addition, there might be eternal 
consequences that cannot be undone.  For example, JWs are convinced that receiving a 
blood transfusion will result in divine judgment.  To ignore or reject such beliefs without 
first engaging them seriously is an act of disrespect for matters of conscience that is 
incompatible with a liberal pluralistic society (in fact, the whole focus of the JW blood 
issue to date has been on the physical risks involved).   
An American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) statement on M-requests seems to 
support Savulescu‟s position:  
The AAP opposes religious doctrines that advocate opposition to medical 
attention for sick children.  Adherence to such views precludes appropriate 
assessment and intervention to protect children.  The AAP believes that laws 
should not encourage or tolerate parental action that prevents implementing 
appropriate medical treatment, nor should laws exempt parents from criminal or 
civil liability in the name of religion…The AAP considers failure to seek medical 
care in such cases to be child neglect, regardless of the motivation.
252
   
 
In this statement, the AAP does not distinguish between different types of harm, focusing 
entirely on physical safety.  In fact, the statement makes it clear that no other conceptions 
of safety can compete.  This is troubling, but I do not think that the AAP is being 
intentionally insensitive.  In fact, a recent policy by the AAP concerning female 
circumcision demonstrates its cultural sensitivity.  The AAP suggests that a compromise 
might be reached between physicians and immigrant communities who request female 
circumcision by offering a “ritual knick” instead.
253
  The “knick,” which has been 
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accepted by some African communities already, is a symbolic practice relating to 
circumcision and is less harmful (but is currently illegal in the U.S.). 
In short, safety should not be analyzed solely in physical terms.  Doing so 
oversimplifies a complex issue, and Savulescu‟s safe enough condition needs to give 
consideration to all types of harm and be more sensitive to cultural and religious beliefs.           
  
A plausible conception of well-being 
 
Second, the notion of a “plausible conception of well-being” is suspect.  
Savulescu explains that he wants to rule out idiosyncratic beliefs, but if a particular belief 
is plausible to seven million people in the world (a conservative estimate of the number 
of active JWs), then it is not idiosyncratic.  He rejects the JW conception of well-being, 
however, when he gives the example that a parent can never refuse a child a life-saving 
blood transfusion.  Plausibility, to Savulescu, appears to be grounded on an objectivist 
view of reasons, which he defines as the following: “Whether a person should be offered 
a treatment turns on the objective values of the physical circumstances of that person‟s 
situation, such as the chance of prolonging a life in which a person can carry on 
worthwhile relationships with others, achieve worthwhile goals, and so on.”
254
  If this is 
not what Savulescu means by “plausible conception of well-being,” then he should make 
this clear.  In the meantime, this interpretation will serve as a useful representation of a 
widespread assumption.  Requiring a physical-health conception of well-being as a 
condition is problematic because few people would satisfy it.   
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Spiritual well-being is at least as important (if not more) to religious communities 
across the world.  Consider, for example, the Buddha‟s teaching on the Middle Way: he 
taught that the path to nirvana was not to be found in the extremes of asceticism or 
earthly living; rather, it was to be found in the middle.  In this way, he affirmed both 
physical and spiritual well-being.  In addition, traditional Christianity rejects the doctrine 
of medical vitalism – that physical life is the highest good.  It teaches that the physical 
body has value based on the creation and resurrection of the body, but it also stresses the 
importance of spiritual well-being and eternal life in heaven (I Timothy 4:8).   
Even non-religious individuals want more than mere physical well-being.  John 
Hardwig points out that physical health and longevity are not the primary goals of most 
patients.  He says, “Patients usually want much, even most, of what doctors have to offer.  
But they do not want all of it; they do not always even want very much of it…Indeed, in 
hindsight it is easy to see that only a very odd person has better health and a longer life as 
her #1 priority.”
255
  Individuals, as Hardwig points out, engage in all kinds of risky 
behaviors on the basis of personal goals and values.  For example, many individuals 
choose academic careers which entail sedentary lifestyles – not the best option if physical 
health and longevity are the goals.  Hence, Savulescu‟s condition of plausibility should 
be expanded to be more representative.   
Another serious problem with Savulescu‟s condition is that he appears to define 
the notion of plausibility by content; in other words, he thinks that there is a set of beliefs 
that ought to be universally recognized as implausible or irrational, for example, the 
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belief that God prohibits blood transfusions.  If content were used to assess plausibility, 
the temptation would be much greater to dismiss the beliefs of other cultures too quickly 
(epistemic imperialism) before investigating how people in those cultures actually arrive 
at their beliefs.  Plausibility as content is not sensitive enough to the diversity of rational 
beliefs across cultures.  A better model would assess plausibility on the basis of 
intellectual virtues because it would acknowledge that (1) there are rational people in 
every culture, (2) that rationality is not defined by one‟s own culture, and (3) it is not the 
case that one‟s own culture is prima facie more reasonable than others.
256
  Rather than 
deciding that certain beliefs are irrational a priori, an intellectual virtue approach would 
involve an investigation into how particular beliefs were arrived at and how the beliefs 
are held.  For example, what sort of evidence are they based on?  What goals do the 
people hold?  How open-minded are they?  In short, a plausibility as content approach is 
too insensitive and needs to be replaced with a model that assesses plausibility (or 
rationality) on the basis of intellectual virtues.    
 
Future autonomy  
 
Savulescu‟s third condition represents the most common concern raised against 
M-requests, namely that parental choices must be consistent with the development of 
autonomy and a reasonable range of future life plans for the child.  The problem with M-
requests for children is that their effects may be irreversible and that it is very possible 
that if the child were old enough to make her own decisions, she would reject the M-
request and the belief system it is based on.  Many think that autonomy with regards to 
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matters of conscience is preeminent because such beliefs are deeply personal and we just 
cannot decide such matters for others, even children.  Such beliefs are too mysterious, 
complex or subjective.  Sheldon sums up this view:    
While the state does not know truly what is in the child‟s best interest, neither 
does anyone else.  What the parents believe is in the child‟s best interest may be 
mistaken.  Given that no one knows what is in the child‟s best interest, the role of 
the state is to ensure that children ultimately become adults, able to decide, 
independently, what is in their own best interest.  It is not even that the state 
assumes that it knows it to be in the child‟s best interest to become an adult.  It 
may not be.  It is simply that no one knows what is in the child‟s best interest, and 
the responsibility of the state is to make certain that persons who make decisions 




Future autonomy is an important principle, but it is complicated because there are 
competing values.  Adrienne M. Martin points out that religious practices are worthy of 
some respect apart from considerations of autonomy: “Surely we value such practices and 
institutions, and individuals‟ participation in them, for multiple reasons unrelated to 
autonomy.  Religion can be a deep source of meaning in individual and community lives; 
it can build and maintain communities.”
258
  Religious liberty is an important value worth 
protecting, and doing so not only means protecting the rights of the autonomous 
individual to practice religion, but also the freedom of families and communities to act on 
faith, even when they impact the lives of their children in ways that would be 
disagreeable to others.   
Moreover, maximizing a child‟s future autonomy is not always in the child‟s 
interests.  For example, if a child has a gift for athletics, the parent‟s decision to enroll her 
in after-school academic programs instead of athletics may preclude the child from ever 
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becoming a world class athlete.  The child‟s future autonomy is protected – she can 
always pick up athletics later – but the option of being a great athlete may have been 
removed.
259
  Parental decision-making limits options one way or another, and it would be 
unfortunate if parents never nurtured their children‟s natural gifts because of concerns 
about maximizing future autonomy.     
 Female circumcision in Africa poses another problem for Savulescu‟s notion of 
autonomy.  In some African cultures, as mentioned earlier, refusal to have a girl 
circumcised may result in social marginalization and the limitation of social options.  As 
Wangila writes, “Female circumcision is viewed by most circumcising communities as an 
initiation into womanhood.  It ensures female fertility, provides a source of identity, and 
prescribes a social status; the lack of circumcision can lead to social exclusion and 
shunning.”
260
  Savulescu is against female circumcision because it limits sexual 
autonomy and is irreversible (in some of its forms); nevertheless, his view would limit 
autonomy in another sense: an uncircumcised girl‟s social opportunities are greatly 
restricted.  Hence, sexual autonomy and social opportunity are in conflict.  Which one is 
more important for young women?  
In Joy‟s case, a pediatric blood transfusion case, Savulescu would stress Joy‟s 
future autonomy and reasonable (physical) life plans, so he would recommend invoking 
parens patriae, securing a court order (as is the case in almost every pediatric blood 
transfusion case), and forcing the transfusion.  Some think that at thirteen Joy might be 
considered a mature minor; if so, autonomy might require that we respect Joy‟s wishes.  
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Debating the mature minor issue is not within the scope of this chapter, so I will simply 
stipulate that she is not a mature minor to make her case relevant to the issues being 
debated here (or we might just change the case so that her age is lowered to ten to ignore 
the mature minor issue).  
 If her caregivers invoke parens patriae and force the transfusion and she survives, 
she might face possible expulsion from her community and rejection by her family, 
which would drastically limit her future autonomy.
261
  If she does not survive, then this 
situation becomes a tragedy upon tragedy because, from the perspective of the family, 
Joy is physically and eternally separated now.   
Some might say that since the Watchtower organization forgives involuntary 
blood transfusions these worries would evaporate.  In fact, for this reason, some JW 
parents are reportedly relieved when they are informed that a court order will be secured, 
for their children will live longer on earth and still see eternal life in heaven.  Although 
many Witnesses may feel this way, it is unlikely that all will, so we need to consider 
those who do not.  The fact that many JWs (and physicians) think that God would not 
hold children responsible for a forced blood transfusion doesn‟t alone justify our ignoring 
the protests of parents who disagree.  Consider a similar case.  I mentioned earlier that 
traditional Christianity would not support the doctrine of medical vitalism, but that does 
not keep some Christians from invoking their Christian beliefs in support of keeping 
patients connected to life support beyond what is thought medically reasonable.  The fact 
that some Christians hold unorthodox beliefs does not mean their beliefs can be ignored.  
They may hold these beliefs very deeply.  Also, a JW recently discussed the transfusion 
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issue with me, and she compared the command to avoid blood products with the 
command to refrain from premarital sex.  She said that JWs would be forgiven if sex 
were forced upon them (rape), but that does not make the experience desirable.  In the 
same way, forced blood transfusions may be forgiven, but that does not solve the problem 
entirely. 
Joy‟s case presents a problem for views like Savulescu‟s, because without a good 
reason to prefer an objectivist (non-religious) view of reasons it is not immediately 
apparent whether this M-request is unreasonable.
262
  Sheldon says that the state‟s only 
concern should be to protect a child‟s future autonomy, so all other worries and 
considerations are irrelevant.  It is certainly easier on caregivers to simply have one pair 
of directives: the future autonomy and physical care of children. Nevertheless, such an 
approach oversimplifies the issue and is incompatible with the virtue of cultural 
sensitivity that we expect from modern medical professionals.  If and when medical 
professionals find it necessary to reject M-requests, it ought to be done only after taking a 
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Three Pediatric Conditions 
 
I have shown that Savulescu‟s standards suffer from a number of problems, but these 
problems can be resolved by making the standards more culturally sensitive.  I suggest 
that his standards be reformulated in the following way:  
1. Rational. Is the request based on a rational conception of well-being? Is it 
possible that a rational person might hold such beliefs? 
2. Safe. Is the request safe enough? Is the risk comparable to other legitimate risks 
the child is exposed to outside the clinic? Here, safety is interpreted holistically: 
physical, psychosocial, and spiritual. 
3. Future-oriented. Does the request have the child‟s future autonomy and 
development in mind? Here, autonomy must be weighed against other values such 
as social opportunity. 
 
The rationality condition can be unpacked in terms of the Principle of Rational Belief 
(PRB) and an analysis of the intellectual virtues.  The other two conditions simply need 
to be understood in a broader and more careful way than what Savulescu argues for.  
Consider these conditions applied to Joy‟s case.  JWs give the following defense 
for rejecting blood transfusions for their children:  
Protecting children from parental abuse and neglect certainly is not objectionable 
to [Witness] parents. But child-neglect laws and the Supreme Court statement 
quoted above often are inappropriately applied to cases involving children of 
Jehovah‟s Witnesses. Why? For one thing, Witness parents have no intention of 
“martyring” their children. If they did, why would they take their children to the 
hospital in the first place? On the contrary, Witness parents willingly seek 
medical treatment for their children. They love their children and want them to 
have good health. But they believe they have a God-given duty to choose 
responsibly the kind of medical treatment that is best for their children. They want 
their children‟s health problems managed without blood. Not only is such 
alternative non-blood care better and safer than blood but, most important, it 
keeps their children in the favor of the great Life-Giver, Jehovah God 




The reasons are two-fold: (1) that blood transfusions are medically risky and (2) that God 
forbids it.
8
  Is it rational to hold these beliefs?  As mentioned earlier, medical risk is at 
best a secondary reason, so I will set it aside.  As I concluded earlier, there is a serious 
doubt about whether JW beliefs about blood are rational, so Joy‟s M-request would likely 
fail the first condition.  And unlike in the cases of adult M-requests, this result cannot be 
ignored because the rationality condition carries much more weight in pediatric cases 
because these are cases of deciding for vulnerable others.  
 Is Joy‟s request safe enough?  To answer this question, physicians would need to 
determine the risk/benefit ratio here and how risky the procedure would be if it were 
attempted with non-blood products.  It is possible with the continuing development of 
such technologies that the risk/benefit ratio entailed in such procedures will become 
comparable to the risks Joy might face in her everyday activities.  If and when it does 
reach that level, Joy‟s request would satisfy the safety condition.  In addition, there might 
be surgeons in the service area that would be willing to attempt the procedures without 
blood, a technique that has become more common.  Again, if the risk entailed in such a 
procedure does not exceed the risk Joy would face outside the clinic, then her request 
satisfies the condition.  
 Is Joy‟s request compatible with the development of her future autonomy?  As 
mentioned above, in Savulescu‟s limited sense of “future autonomy” the answer is a clear 
“no” because an early death precludes any further development.  However, as I 
mentioned, there is more to autonomy than just the ability to make decisions in the future.  
We would also need to consider how Joy‟s community would treat her after learning of 
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her transfusion.  Would she be ostracized or embraced?  Would Joy‟s family members 
disown her or continue to care for her?  Given her geographic location and access to 
public services, would there be other alternatives for her if she were shunned by her 
family and community?  Moreover, what does her community teach about her eternal 
destiny?  If the physicians force this treatment on her, does the community teach that God 
will forgive her?  Does she believe this as well? 
 It is impossible to say with certainty without knowing more details whether Joy‟s 
M-request should be honored.  Failure of the rationality condition is significant, but if the 
procedure could be safely attempted, then satisfying the safety condition might outweigh 
the fact that her M-request fails the rationality condition (for the sake of religious 
accommodation and Joy‟s future in the community).  However, it may come down to 
how much risk is involved in alternate procedures.  If the risk is high and it is likely that 
her community will forgive her and embrace her after the fact (which is probably the 
case), then the M-request should be denied.   
 So, it is possible that an M-request could fail the rationality condition but satisfy 
the safe and future-oriented conditions.  For example, female circumcision in Africa may 
fail PRB.  It is unlikely that a phronimos would ever believe that removal of a clitoris 
would ensure a girl‟s purity or fidelity (you don‟t need a functioning clitoris to be 
unfaithful).  Nevertheless, virtuous parents might still choose to circumcise their 
daughters due to the social opportunities or protection it would secure for the child.  As 
mentioned earlier, sexual autonomy is an important value, but it is not the only value.  On 
the other hand, it is hard to imagine how an M-request for female circumcision would 
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ever be granted outside a limited number of African communities.  For example, all such 
M-requests made in the U.S. should be denied (even if the patient is African) because 
there are plenty of social opportunities for uncircumcised women in the larger society.  
This might entail exclusion from the patient‟s family or ethnic community, but in a 
diverse society like the United States, there are other options.  This is not to say that such 
exclusions do not represent serious harms.  It is only to say that such harms are 
outweighed, in this case, by other harms.  
 
Faith Healing and Children 
 In the Pamela Hamilton case, there is not enough information available about the 
Church of God of the Union Assembly to know whether its teachings would satisfy PRB.  
On the other hand, the church appears to identify itself as a Bible believing church on its 
website, and it mentions a connection with The Church of God of the Mountain 
Assembly, which has as its first creedal statement: “We believe the Bible to be inspired, 
the only infallible Word of God.”
263
  This connects them to the long tradition of biblical 
interpretation mentioned in the discussion of JW beliefs in chapter five and make it 
possible to evaluate their beliefs and practices in the context of this tradition.  The virtues 
of this hermeneutical tradition are, as mentioned above: the love of knowledge, firmness, 
courage and caution, humility, and autonomy.  To proceed, we would need to listen to the 
parents carefully to discern whether they exemplify these virtues.  We should discover 
whether they have considered other biblical interpretations, whether they have truly 
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considered the consequences of not seeking medical treatment, and whether they have 
improperly surrendered their autonomy to the church.  We should also investigate the 
church itself to see whether it cultivates these virtues among its members.  We should ask 
whether the church suppresses dissenting views, whether it engages in dialogue with 
members of other denominations who read the Bible, and whether it enjoins its followers 
to think for themselves.  Only after careful consideration of these questions will we be 
able to discover whether their beliefs satisfy PRB.  
 On the other hand, the Hamilton‟s M-request appears to do quite poorly under the 
other conditions.  It is not very safe: Pamela will most certainly die if left untreated, 
which happened anyway, some say, because Pamela‟s treatment was delayed.  And the 
other risks we might consider – social and spiritual – pale against this fact, especially 
when considering that this case occurred in Tennessee, where there are plenty of other 
Christian denominations and opportunities for community engagement.  While Pamela‟s 
father was a minister for the church, excommunication from the Union Assembly would 
not be as disastrous for an individual living in Tennessee as it would be for a young 
uncircumcised girl in Africa to be ostracized from her community, and there are no 
apparent eternal consequences such as in the JW case.  If left untreated, Pamela‟s safety 
and future autonomy are clearly threatened, and the benefits of being treated medically 
outweigh other concerns.   
In addition, the size of the community matters here, which is the first of the 
MVRB conditions.  The Union Assembly is a relatively small community, roughly only 
thirty-five churches found across seven states (as of 2012).  While the fact that the M-
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request was made on the basis of a belief held by the community will give the M-request 
some weight, the fact that the community is small will hurt its chances.  Moreover, a 
religious interpreter would connect the Union Assembly with the larger community of 
biblical interpretation and conclude that the church‟s beliefs are aberrant.  Most churches 
in the biblical tradition request both medical care and prayer.  The failure to satisfy so 
many conditions would result in the Hamilton‟s request being denied.  
 Andrew‟s case, the Christian Science case in chapter two, is very similar to the 
Pamela Hamilton case in that Andrew‟s parents sought religious healing instead of 
medical treatment.  Christian Science teaches its followers to pursue healing through 
prayer and that reality is fundamentally spiritual.  As one Christian Scientist puts it: “The 
reason that Christian Science treatment, or prayer, heals is that it opens human thought to 
what is actually there, to God‟s infinite goodness, which includes no sickness, evil, or 
fear, and to God‟s man, who is deserving of all good.”
264
  Are such beliefs compatible 
with PRB? 
 Mary Baker Eddy, the founder of Christian Science, taught a kind of subjective 
idealism similar to what the English philosopher George Berkeley taught.  All being is 
found in God‟s mind.  As Philip Pecorino describes:  
[God] is and encompasses all aspects of existence as he is referred to as “God is 
All-in-all.”  Mrs. Mary Baker Eddy…states that due to God‟s spiritual nature, 
humanity…must also appropriately be spiritual and not material…The true 
universe in its entirety, according to divine metaphysics, or Christian Science, is 
comprised of ideas that are completely spiritual and fashioned by divine thought, 
just as Berkeley espouses in his immaterialist views.  Therefore, Christian 
Scientists specify that we as humans are in truth spirits produced by divinity, and 
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in consequence are all incarnations of God.  If we ignorantly deny the truth of 
God‟s spiritual existence, it is then that we will mistakenly envision the world in 
the form of material…All ideas hostile to God‟s infiniteness, permanence, and 
goodness, such as conceptions of death, hell, and evil, are flawed and wicked 




Subjective idealism is not inherently irrational unless we are ready to call George 
Berkeley irrational, and I see no reason to do that given his impact on the history of 
philosophy.  Also, Hinduism, one of the greatest religious traditions, can be interpreted as 
a form of idealism,
266
 so I‟m inclined to think idealism as a philosophy would pass PRB.  
However, Christian Science derives many of its teachings from the Bible and claims to 
follow the teachings of Jesus Christ, which would connect it to the long tradition of 
biblical interpretation like the Union Assembly and JWs above.  Hence, we can ask of 
Christian Science the same questions: does the church cultivate intellectual and 
interpretive virtues?  Does the church encourage its followers to think for themselves?  If 
the answer is no, it may fail PRB.  
 In addition, Andrew‟s M-request may do quite poorly under the other conditions.  
By not seeking locally and easily-available medical care, Andrew‟s father needlessly put 
his son‟s safety and future autonomy in jeopardy.  Hickey and Lyckholm argue: “The 
ethical calculus of benefit/burden is clearly in favor of benefit of medical treatment.  It 
would seem that medical treatment of a Christian Scientist‟s child does not impose 
specific or harsh burdens on the child or the parent.  Alternatively, the burdens imposed if 
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the child is not treated are considerable, including severe morbidity and even 
mortality.”
267
  Apparently, there is no banishment from the community and no permanent 
eternal consequences such as what occurs when a JW requests a blood transfusion.  This 




Hickey and Lyckholm caution against overriding parental requests too quickly.  
They cite Beauchamp and Childress in proposing a set of conditions for when to allow 
the standard of care to override parental M-requests:  
(1) Better reasons can be offered to act on the overriding norm than on the 
infringed norm. 
(2) The moral objective justifying the infringement has a realistic prospect of 
achievement. 
(3) No morally preferable alternative actions can be substituted. 
(4) The form of infringement selected is the least possible commensurate with 
achieving the primary goal of the action. 
(5) The agent seeks to minimize the negative effects of the infringement.268 
While these conditions are important and helpful, one could satisfy them without taking 
the parent‟s beliefs seriously, which takes us back to the discussion of respect in chapter 
three.  
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Parents who make M-requests must be listened to and fully understood before a 
decision is made, which can occur by putting the parents into dialogue with the 
caregivers and asking them to explain their beliefs, if possible.  However, there may be 
language and cultural barriers, and the stress of the situation may prevent productive 
dialogue.  In such cases, it may be necessary to consult a religious interpreter – the 
parents‟ own minister, a hospital chaplain, or a religious studies professor.  An interpreter 
should be able to open a window into the parents‟ world and explain to caregivers why 
the parents hold the beliefs they do.       
Taking parents‟ beliefs seriously also includes examining them under PRB.  As I 
have shown, M-requests for children must be held to a higher standard than M-requests 
for competent adults, and I believe the conditions I suggest – (1) rational, (2) safe, and (3) 

















 The threshold for honoring M-requests for children must be higher than the 
threshold for honoring requests made by adult patients because there is more at stake than 
when competent adults make M-requests for themselves.  M-requests in pediatrics must 
satisfy three conditions: (1) rational, (2) safe, and (3) future-oriented, whereas M-requests 
for adults only need to satisfy the MVRB conditions: the religious belief (1) is held by a 
community, (2) is deeply held, (3) would pass the test of a religious interpreter, and (4) 
does no harm.  Applying only the MVRB conditions to adults – a lower threshold – is in 
keeping with the emphasis on patient autonomy.  
 I have considered other approaches to dealing with M-requests but have found 
each to be unsatisfactory.  For example, Savulescu‟s conditions for honoring M-requests 
in pediatrics are not culturally sensitive enough, and neither are Meyers‟ conditions for 
honoring M-requests in proxy decision-making.  The conditions I propose, however, are 
based on a theory of virtue that takes religious beliefs seriously and recognizes the 
existence of rational beliefs across cultures, while, at the same time, holding M-requests 
to a high moral standard.  
 While I have only applied these conditions to a small number of cases here, they 
can be applied to any M-request, no matter how unusual.  This said, it may be asking too 
much to require doctors to become proficient in applying the conditions.  For one, it is 
impossible to become a religious expert on the religious beliefs of every patient, and 
there are plenty of others who can act as religious interpreters.  Anyway, doctors have 
plenty of responsibilities already.  One solution might be for each hospital to form a 
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review board (like an IRB) that carefully considers the M-requests and religious beliefs 
of patients the hospital regularly serves.  For example, if the hospital regularly serves 
JWs, then it would be efficient to have a policy regarding JW M-requests.  On the other 
hand, if a JW has never been treated in their hospital, then a specific policy would be 
unnecessary.  
However, policy-making must be done carefully: M-requests that fail the 
conditions in one area (or for one kind of patient) might be honored in another.  Religious 
beliefs might be rational for one religious community in one location but may be 
irrational for adherents of the same religion in a different location.  For example, it is 
possible that a phronimos would believe the Watchtower teachings on blood products if 
she lived in the South American jungle (since contact with other views – theological and 
medical – might be limited), but it may be equally possible that a phronimos would not 
believe such teachings if she lived in Knoxville, Tennessee.  It might take more of a 
head-in-the-sand attitude to sustain the belief in Knoxville than it would in the jungle.  
Therefore, two JW patients, each from a different place, could be admitted – even to the 
same hospital – and make similar M-requests while one request is granted and the other 
denied.  Also, it important to note that ruling out M-requests in advance does not commit 
Savulescu‟s error of defining plausibility in terms of content because the PRB condition 
employs norms of reason in its procedure.  It acknowledges that phronimoi can be found 
in many different cultures.  
In short, this dissertation represents a new approach for dealing with M-requests 
that is both culturally-sensitive and morally rigorous, and it is this balance that makes this 
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approach unique.  Grounded in virtue ethics, the PRB condition has the philosophical 
resources to solve problems and stand up to scrutiny, and the conditions I have offered 
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